Dynamic spectrum leasing and service selection in spectrum secondary market of cognitive radio networks

We consider a problem of dynamic spectrum leasing in a spectrum secondary market of cognitive radio networks where secondary service providers lease spectrum from spectrum brokers to provide service to secondary users. The problem is challenging when the optimal decisions of both secondary providers...

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Main Authors: Zhu, Kun, Niyato, Dusit, Wang, Ping, Han, Zhu
Other Authors: School of Computer Engineering
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2013
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Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/96801
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/11582
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-968012020-05-28T07:17:34Z Dynamic spectrum leasing and service selection in spectrum secondary market of cognitive radio networks Zhu, Kun Niyato, Dusit Wang, Ping Han, Zhu School of Computer Engineering DRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering We consider a problem of dynamic spectrum leasing in a spectrum secondary market of cognitive radio networks where secondary service providers lease spectrum from spectrum brokers to provide service to secondary users. The problem is challenging when the optimal decisions of both secondary providers and secondary users are made dynamically under competition. To address this problem, a two-level dynamic game framework is developed in this paper. Since the secondary users can adapt the service selection strategies according to the received service quality and price, the dynamic service selection is modeled as an evolutionary game at the lower level. The replicator dynamics is applied to model the service selection adaptation and the evolutionary equilibrium is considered to be the solution. With dynamic service selection, competitive secondary providers can dynamically lease spectrum to provide service to secondary users. A spectrum leasing differential game is formulated to model this competition at the upper level. Both simultaneous play model and asynchronous play model are considered. The service selection distribution of the underlying evolutionary game describes the state of the upper differential game. Both open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria are obtained as the solution of dynamic control of the differential game. Numerical comparison shows the advantages over static control in terms of profit and convergence speed. 2013-07-16T07:08:08Z 2019-12-06T19:35:15Z 2013-07-16T07:08:08Z 2019-12-06T19:35:15Z 2012 2012 Journal Article Zhu, K., Niyato, D., Wang, P., & Han, Z. (2012). Dynamic Spectrum Leasing and Service Selection in Spectrum Secondary Market of Cognitive Radio Networks. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 11(3), 1136-1145. 1536-1276 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/96801 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/11582 10.1109/TWC.2012.010312.110732 en IEEE transactions on wireless communications © 2012 IEEE.
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
country Singapore
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic DRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering
spellingShingle DRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering
Zhu, Kun
Niyato, Dusit
Wang, Ping
Han, Zhu
Dynamic spectrum leasing and service selection in spectrum secondary market of cognitive radio networks
description We consider a problem of dynamic spectrum leasing in a spectrum secondary market of cognitive radio networks where secondary service providers lease spectrum from spectrum brokers to provide service to secondary users. The problem is challenging when the optimal decisions of both secondary providers and secondary users are made dynamically under competition. To address this problem, a two-level dynamic game framework is developed in this paper. Since the secondary users can adapt the service selection strategies according to the received service quality and price, the dynamic service selection is modeled as an evolutionary game at the lower level. The replicator dynamics is applied to model the service selection adaptation and the evolutionary equilibrium is considered to be the solution. With dynamic service selection, competitive secondary providers can dynamically lease spectrum to provide service to secondary users. A spectrum leasing differential game is formulated to model this competition at the upper level. Both simultaneous play model and asynchronous play model are considered. The service selection distribution of the underlying evolutionary game describes the state of the upper differential game. Both open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria are obtained as the solution of dynamic control of the differential game. Numerical comparison shows the advantages over static control in terms of profit and convergence speed.
author2 School of Computer Engineering
author_facet School of Computer Engineering
Zhu, Kun
Niyato, Dusit
Wang, Ping
Han, Zhu
format Article
author Zhu, Kun
Niyato, Dusit
Wang, Ping
Han, Zhu
author_sort Zhu, Kun
title Dynamic spectrum leasing and service selection in spectrum secondary market of cognitive radio networks
title_short Dynamic spectrum leasing and service selection in spectrum secondary market of cognitive radio networks
title_full Dynamic spectrum leasing and service selection in spectrum secondary market of cognitive radio networks
title_fullStr Dynamic spectrum leasing and service selection in spectrum secondary market of cognitive radio networks
title_full_unstemmed Dynamic spectrum leasing and service selection in spectrum secondary market of cognitive radio networks
title_sort dynamic spectrum leasing and service selection in spectrum secondary market of cognitive radio networks
publishDate 2013
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/96801
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/11582
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