Budget feasible mechanism design : from prior-free to Bayesian
Budget feasible mechanism design studies procurement combinatorial auctions in which the sellers have private costs to produce items, and the buyer (auctioneer) aims to maximize a social valuation function on subsets of items, under the budget constraint on the total payment. One of the most importa...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Conference or Workshop Item |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2013
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/98770 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/12821 |
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| Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
| Language: | English |