Budget feasible mechanism design : from prior-free to Bayesian

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: Bei, Xiaohui, Chen, Ning, Gravin, Nick, Lu, Pinyan
• مؤلفون آخرون: School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences
• التنسيق: Conference or Workshop Item
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: 2013
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/98770; http://hdl.handle.net/10220/12821
• المؤسسة: Nanyang Technological University

Budget feasible mechanism design studies procurement combinatorial auctions in which the sellers have private costs to produce items, and the buyer (auctioneer) aims to maximize a social valuation function on subsets of items, under the budget constraint on the total payment. One of the most importa...