Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
Weighted voting games provide a simple model of decision-making in human societies and multi-agent systems. Such games are described by a set of players, a list of playersʼ weights, and a quota; a coalition of the players is said to be winning if the total weight of its members meets or exceeds the...
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Main Authors: | Zuckerman, Michael, Faliszewski, Piotr, Bachrach, Yoram, Elkind, Edith |
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Other Authors: | School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2013
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Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/98888 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/12585 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
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