Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information

10.3982/TE2927

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: He, W., Sun, Y.
Other Authors: ECONOMICS
Format: Article
Published: Society for Economic Theory 2021
Subjects:
C62
C73
Online Access:https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/196163
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Institution: National University of Singapore
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spelling sg-nus-scholar.10635-1961632024-03-26T09:06:00Z Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information He, W. Sun, Y. ECONOMICS almost perfect information atomless reference measure atomless transition C62 C73 Dynamic games perfect information subgame-perfect equilibrium 10.3982/TE2927 Theoretical Economics 15 2 811-859 2021-08-10T03:02:46Z 2021-08-10T03:02:46Z 2020 Article He, W., Sun, Y. (2020). Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information. Theoretical Economics 15 (2) : 811-859. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2927 1933-6837 https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/196163 Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Society for Economic Theory Scopus OA2020
institution National University of Singapore
building NUS Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NUS Library
collection ScholarBank@NUS
topic almost perfect information
atomless reference measure
atomless transition
C62
C73
Dynamic games
perfect information
subgame-perfect equilibrium
spellingShingle almost perfect information
atomless reference measure
atomless transition
C62
C73
Dynamic games
perfect information
subgame-perfect equilibrium
He, W.
Sun, Y.
Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information
description 10.3982/TE2927
author2 ECONOMICS
author_facet ECONOMICS
He, W.
Sun, Y.
format Article
author He, W.
Sun, Y.
author_sort He, W.
title Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information
title_short Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information
title_full Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information
title_fullStr Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information
title_full_unstemmed Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information
title_sort dynamic games with (almost) perfect information
publisher Society for Economic Theory
publishDate 2021
url https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/196163
_version_ 1795301530009600000