Optimal Orchestration of Rewards and Punishments in Rank-Order Contests

Optimal Orchestration of Rewards and Punishments in Rank-Order Contests

10.1016/j.jet.2022.105594

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Liu, Bin, Lu, Jingfeng
Other Authors: ECONOMICS
Format: Article
Published: Elsevier BV 2023
Subjects:
All-pay auction
Cross-rank/scenario transfer
Incomplete information
Negative prize
Optimal contest.
Online Access:https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/235805
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Institution: National University of Singapore

Internet

https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/235805

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