The Long and Short of It: Evidence of Year-End Price Manipulation by Short Sellers

We identify a setting in which there is a predictable incentive for short sellers to manipulate prices, and we find patterns consistent with short sellers manipulating prices. Specifically, we find that stocks with high short interest experience abnormally low returns on the last trading day of the...

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Main Authors: Blocher, Jesse, Engelberg, Joseph, Reed, Adam V.
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2010
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/bnp_research/16
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=bnp_research
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spelling sg-smu-ink.bnp_research-10162018-06-13T04:58:02Z The Long and Short of It: Evidence of Year-End Price Manipulation by Short Sellers Blocher, Jesse Engelberg, Joseph Reed, Adam V. We identify a setting in which there is a predictable incentive for short sellers to manipulate prices, and we find patterns consistent with short sellers manipulating prices. Specifically, we find that stocks with high short interest experience abnormally low returns on the last trading day of the year. This effect is strongest among stocks that are easily manipulated and during the last hour of trading. Further, this effect reverses at the beginning of the year, consistent with the temporary nature of price manipulation. We show that hedge funds’ portfolios are closely related to market-wide short interest, suggesting that hedge funds, with their convex compensation structures, may generate the patterns we observe. In additional analysis, we find that larger price effects are associated with higher idiosyncratic volatility, offering a potential explanation for why temporary price effects are allowed to persist in the presence of rational arbitrageurs, but we find no evidence to suggest that extended non-trading-day holding periods play a role in the magnitude of the effects. Finally, we provide evidence of mutual funds and short sellers avoiding each other, and we show that downward pressure by short sellers is outweighed by upward pressure by buyers. In other words, since short sellers’ incentives are mirrored by buyers’ incentives in the opposite direction, our experiment provides evidence that short sellers manipulate prices in much the same way buyers do, and manipulation by short sellers is no stronger than manipulation by buyers. 2010-09-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/bnp_research/16 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=bnp_research http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Short sellers price manipulation hedge funds Finance and Financial Management
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
country Singapore
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Short sellers
price manipulation
hedge funds
Finance and Financial Management
spellingShingle Short sellers
price manipulation
hedge funds
Finance and Financial Management
Blocher, Jesse
Engelberg, Joseph
Reed, Adam V.
The Long and Short of It: Evidence of Year-End Price Manipulation by Short Sellers
description We identify a setting in which there is a predictable incentive for short sellers to manipulate prices, and we find patterns consistent with short sellers manipulating prices. Specifically, we find that stocks with high short interest experience abnormally low returns on the last trading day of the year. This effect is strongest among stocks that are easily manipulated and during the last hour of trading. Further, this effect reverses at the beginning of the year, consistent with the temporary nature of price manipulation. We show that hedge funds’ portfolios are closely related to market-wide short interest, suggesting that hedge funds, with their convex compensation structures, may generate the patterns we observe. In additional analysis, we find that larger price effects are associated with higher idiosyncratic volatility, offering a potential explanation for why temporary price effects are allowed to persist in the presence of rational arbitrageurs, but we find no evidence to suggest that extended non-trading-day holding periods play a role in the magnitude of the effects. Finally, we provide evidence of mutual funds and short sellers avoiding each other, and we show that downward pressure by short sellers is outweighed by upward pressure by buyers. In other words, since short sellers’ incentives are mirrored by buyers’ incentives in the opposite direction, our experiment provides evidence that short sellers manipulate prices in much the same way buyers do, and manipulation by short sellers is no stronger than manipulation by buyers.
format text
author Blocher, Jesse
Engelberg, Joseph
Reed, Adam V.
author_facet Blocher, Jesse
Engelberg, Joseph
Reed, Adam V.
author_sort Blocher, Jesse
title The Long and Short of It: Evidence of Year-End Price Manipulation by Short Sellers
title_short The Long and Short of It: Evidence of Year-End Price Manipulation by Short Sellers
title_full The Long and Short of It: Evidence of Year-End Price Manipulation by Short Sellers
title_fullStr The Long and Short of It: Evidence of Year-End Price Manipulation by Short Sellers
title_full_unstemmed The Long and Short of It: Evidence of Year-End Price Manipulation by Short Sellers
title_sort long and short of it: evidence of year-end price manipulation by short sellers
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2010
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/bnp_research/16
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=bnp_research
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