Central inspection teams and the enforcement of environmental regulations in China

Despite the existence of a comprehensive set of environmental regulations, China’s environmental issues continue largely unabated and are increasingly leading to discontent among its citizens. Mirroring recent governance trends in China, the central government has increasingly taken a more hands-on-...

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Main Authors: XIANG, C., VAN GEVELT, Terry
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2020
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cis_research/59
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/cis_research/article/1058/viewcontent/1_s2.0_S146290112030201X_main.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.cis_research-10582023-01-19T08:13:15Z Central inspection teams and the enforcement of environmental regulations in China XIANG, C. VAN GEVELT, Terry Despite the existence of a comprehensive set of environmental regulations, China’s environmental issues continue largely unabated and are increasingly leading to discontent among its citizens. Mirroring recent governance trends in China, the central government has increasingly taken a more hands-on-role to ensure the enforcement of environmental regulations by local government officials. One manifestation of this effort to re-centralize environmental institutions has been the establishment and deployment of Central Environmental Inspection Teams (CEITs). CEITs report directly to the central government and are dispatched to carry out crackdowns where the central government has reason to believe that environmental regulations are not being enforced. With over 29,000 companies fined and around 18,000 local government officials disciplined, the CEIT has been heralded as a great success by the central government. Using a combination of primary and secondary data, we partially reconstruct the inaugural CEIT deployment in Hebei province in 2016 from the perspectives of government officials, private and state-owned companies, and local residents. While we generally find that the CEIT has proven effective in identifying and rectifying violations of environmental regulations, as an institutional solution it is inefficient and highly-resource intensive, likely to generate unintended governance outcomes in the medium-to-longer run, and has significant social justice implications. 2020-10-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cis_research/59 info:doi/10.1016/j.envsci.2020.06.018 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/cis_research/article/1058/viewcontent/1_s2.0_S146290112030201X_main.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection College of Integrative Studies eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Environmental regulation Environmental governance Campaign-style enforcement Central environment inspection teams China Asian Studies Environmental Sciences Urban Studies and Planning
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Environmental regulation
Environmental governance
Campaign-style enforcement
Central environment inspection teams
China
Asian Studies
Environmental Sciences
Urban Studies and Planning
spellingShingle Environmental regulation
Environmental governance
Campaign-style enforcement
Central environment inspection teams
China
Asian Studies
Environmental Sciences
Urban Studies and Planning
XIANG, C.
VAN GEVELT, Terry
Central inspection teams and the enforcement of environmental regulations in China
description Despite the existence of a comprehensive set of environmental regulations, China’s environmental issues continue largely unabated and are increasingly leading to discontent among its citizens. Mirroring recent governance trends in China, the central government has increasingly taken a more hands-on-role to ensure the enforcement of environmental regulations by local government officials. One manifestation of this effort to re-centralize environmental institutions has been the establishment and deployment of Central Environmental Inspection Teams (CEITs). CEITs report directly to the central government and are dispatched to carry out crackdowns where the central government has reason to believe that environmental regulations are not being enforced. With over 29,000 companies fined and around 18,000 local government officials disciplined, the CEIT has been heralded as a great success by the central government. Using a combination of primary and secondary data, we partially reconstruct the inaugural CEIT deployment in Hebei province in 2016 from the perspectives of government officials, private and state-owned companies, and local residents. While we generally find that the CEIT has proven effective in identifying and rectifying violations of environmental regulations, as an institutional solution it is inefficient and highly-resource intensive, likely to generate unintended governance outcomes in the medium-to-longer run, and has significant social justice implications.
format text
author XIANG, C.
VAN GEVELT, Terry
author_facet XIANG, C.
VAN GEVELT, Terry
author_sort XIANG, C.
title Central inspection teams and the enforcement of environmental regulations in China
title_short Central inspection teams and the enforcement of environmental regulations in China
title_full Central inspection teams and the enforcement of environmental regulations in China
title_fullStr Central inspection teams and the enforcement of environmental regulations in China
title_full_unstemmed Central inspection teams and the enforcement of environmental regulations in China
title_sort central inspection teams and the enforcement of environmental regulations in china
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2020
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cis_research/59
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/cis_research/article/1058/viewcontent/1_s2.0_S146290112030201X_main.pdf
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