Milestone payments or royalties? Contract design for R&D licensing

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: CRAMA, Pascale, DE REYCK, Bert, DEGRAEVE, Zeger
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2008
• الموضوعات: health care; pharmaceutical; research and development; innovation; principal-agent modeling; adverse selection; moral hazard; contract design; Operations and Supply Chain Management; Technology and Innovation
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/869; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/1868/viewcontent/Crama2008MilestonePayments_PP.pdf
• المؤسسة: Singapore Management University

We study how innovators can optimally design licensing contracts when there is incomplete information on the licensee's valuation of the innovation, and limited control over the licensee's development efforts. A licensing contract typically contains an up-front payment, milestone payments...