Milestone payments or royalties? Contract design for R&D licensing

• Main Authors: CRAMA, Pascale, DE REYCK, Bert, DEGRAEVE, Zeger
• 格式: text
• 語言: English
• 出版: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2008
• 主題: health care; pharmaceutical; research and development; innovation; principal-agent modeling; adverse selection; moral hazard; contract design; Operations and Supply Chain Management; Technology and Innovation
• 在線閱讀: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/869; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/1868/viewcontent/Crama2008MilestonePayments_PP.pdf
• 機構: Singapore Management University

We study how innovators can optimally design licensing contracts when there is incomplete information on the licensee's valuation of the innovation, and limited control over the licensee's development efforts. A licensing contract typically contains an up-front payment, milestone payments...