Alternative corporate governance systems in Japanese firms: Implications for a shift to stockholder-centered corporate governance

In Asia, the recent catastrophic decline in regional stock markets, continuing currency crisis and failures of major financial institutions and industrial corporations have increased domestic and international interest in corporate governance. Nowhere is this greater than in Japan where financial in...

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Main Authors: YOSHIKAWA, Toru, PHAN, Phillip H.
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2001
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/2291
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/3290/viewcontent/Alternative_corporate_governance_systems.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.lkcsb_research-32902019-10-04T06:40:14Z Alternative corporate governance systems in Japanese firms: Implications for a shift to stockholder-centered corporate governance YOSHIKAWA, Toru PHAN, Phillip H. In Asia, the recent catastrophic decline in regional stock markets, continuing currency crisis and failures of major financial institutions and industrial corporations have increased domestic and international interest in corporate governance. Nowhere is this greater than in Japan where financial institution reform has catapulted this to the fore. Agency theory and institutional theory, together with comparative case examples, are used in a study to derive some propositions on the dynamics of changing corporate governance systems in Japanese firms. The study argues for the co-existence of stakeholder and shareholder-centered corporate governance systems in Japan. This argument has an important implication for corporate governance research and agency theory. Namely, changes in ownership structure and institutional expectations would force firms to focus on maximizing shareholder value even where the interests of stakeholders are more emphasized. It suggests an environmental selection mechanism to ensure the emergence of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms to solve the agency problem. Further, the loss of competitiveness and the prolonged poor performance of firms can change the institutional norms to emphasize asset efficiency and transparency rather than stability and business ties. 2001-06-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/2291 info:doi/10.1023/A:1010663807192 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/3290/viewcontent/Alternative_corporate_governance_systems.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Asian Studies Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Corporate Finance
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Asian Studies
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Corporate Finance
spellingShingle Asian Studies
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Corporate Finance
YOSHIKAWA, Toru
PHAN, Phillip H.
Alternative corporate governance systems in Japanese firms: Implications for a shift to stockholder-centered corporate governance
description In Asia, the recent catastrophic decline in regional stock markets, continuing currency crisis and failures of major financial institutions and industrial corporations have increased domestic and international interest in corporate governance. Nowhere is this greater than in Japan where financial institution reform has catapulted this to the fore. Agency theory and institutional theory, together with comparative case examples, are used in a study to derive some propositions on the dynamics of changing corporate governance systems in Japanese firms. The study argues for the co-existence of stakeholder and shareholder-centered corporate governance systems in Japan. This argument has an important implication for corporate governance research and agency theory. Namely, changes in ownership structure and institutional expectations would force firms to focus on maximizing shareholder value even where the interests of stakeholders are more emphasized. It suggests an environmental selection mechanism to ensure the emergence of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms to solve the agency problem. Further, the loss of competitiveness and the prolonged poor performance of firms can change the institutional norms to emphasize asset efficiency and transparency rather than stability and business ties.
format text
author YOSHIKAWA, Toru
PHAN, Phillip H.
author_facet YOSHIKAWA, Toru
PHAN, Phillip H.
author_sort YOSHIKAWA, Toru
title Alternative corporate governance systems in Japanese firms: Implications for a shift to stockholder-centered corporate governance
title_short Alternative corporate governance systems in Japanese firms: Implications for a shift to stockholder-centered corporate governance
title_full Alternative corporate governance systems in Japanese firms: Implications for a shift to stockholder-centered corporate governance
title_fullStr Alternative corporate governance systems in Japanese firms: Implications for a shift to stockholder-centered corporate governance
title_full_unstemmed Alternative corporate governance systems in Japanese firms: Implications for a shift to stockholder-centered corporate governance
title_sort alternative corporate governance systems in japanese firms: implications for a shift to stockholder-centered corporate governance
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2001
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/2291
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/3290/viewcontent/Alternative_corporate_governance_systems.pdf
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