What's wrong with rights?
We investigate a failure cost hypothesis of equity flotation mechanism choice, in which the expected failure cost of non-underwritten rights offerings influences the underwriting decision. Although issuers can, in theory, completely self-insure these offerings with a sufficiently low subscription pr...
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2012
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sg-smu-ink.lkcsb_research-42832013-02-05T09:48:06Z What's wrong with rights? Duong, Truong Singh, Rajdeep TAN, Eng Joo We investigate a failure cost hypothesis of equity flotation mechanism choice, in which the expected failure cost of non-underwritten rights offerings influences the underwriting decision. Although issuers can, in theory, completely self-insure these offerings with a sufficiently low subscription price, we find evidence consistent with constraints in subscription price-setting - subscription price signals project quality, and the propensity to underwrite is decreasing in expected overall takeup. We also find that firm ownership concentration is inversely related to the likelihood of underwriting only because of its positive relation with subscription precommitment, a supplementary insurance mechanism. These results support the failure cost hypothesis as a potential explanation for the rights issue paradox. 2012-01-01T08:00:00Z text https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3284 info:doi/10.2139/ssrn.1698626 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1698626 Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Rights Paradox Failure Seasoned equity offerings Finance and Financial Management |
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Rights Paradox Failure Seasoned equity offerings Finance and Financial Management Duong, Truong Singh, Rajdeep TAN, Eng Joo What's wrong with rights? |
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We investigate a failure cost hypothesis of equity flotation mechanism choice, in which the expected failure cost of non-underwritten rights offerings influences the underwriting decision. Although issuers can, in theory, completely self-insure these offerings with a sufficiently low subscription price, we find evidence consistent with constraints in subscription price-setting - subscription price signals project quality, and the propensity to underwrite is decreasing in expected overall takeup. We also find that firm ownership concentration is inversely related to the likelihood of underwriting only because of its positive relation with subscription precommitment, a supplementary insurance mechanism. These results support the failure cost hypothesis as a potential explanation for the rights issue paradox. |
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Duong, Truong Singh, Rajdeep TAN, Eng Joo |
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Duong, Truong Singh, Rajdeep TAN, Eng Joo |
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Duong, Truong |
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What's wrong with rights? |
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What's wrong with rights? |
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What's wrong with rights? |
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What's wrong with rights? |
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What's wrong with rights? |
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what's wrong with rights? |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
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2012 |
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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3284 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1698626 |
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