Auctions for Transferable Objects: Theory and Evidence
This paper studies the hypothesis that auctions with resale markets result in higher prices. The vehicle quota system introduced in Singapore in May 1990 provides the setting. The Certificates of Entitlement (COEs) necessary to purchase new cars were initially transferable for all quota categories....
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1992
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sg-smu-ink.lkcsb_research-44032018-08-15T07:41:58Z Auctions for Transferable Objects: Theory and Evidence KOH, Winston LEE, Kuo Chuen David This paper studies the hypothesis that auctions with resale markets result in higher prices. The vehicle quota system introduced in Singapore in May 1990 provides the setting. The Certificates of Entitlement (COEs) necessary to purchase new cars were initially transferable for all quota categories. After October 1991, COEs for four major categories became non-transferable. Our results indicate that while the conversion to non-transferability eliminated speculation, it has also intensified competition among car distributors. Auctions for non-transferable COEs in fact led to higher COE prices in three of the four categories. 1992-01-01T08:00:00Z text https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3404 Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Business Economics |
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Singapore Management University |
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SMU Libraries |
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Asia |
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Singapore Singapore |
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SMU Libraries |
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InK@SMU |
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English |
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Business Economics |
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Business Economics KOH, Winston LEE, Kuo Chuen David Auctions for Transferable Objects: Theory and Evidence |
| description |
This paper studies the hypothesis that auctions with resale markets result in higher prices. The vehicle quota system introduced in Singapore in May 1990 provides the setting. The Certificates of Entitlement (COEs) necessary to purchase new cars were initially transferable for all quota categories. After October 1991, COEs for four major categories became non-transferable. Our results indicate that while the conversion to non-transferability eliminated speculation, it has also intensified competition among car distributors. Auctions for non-transferable COEs in fact led to higher COE prices in three of the four categories. |
| format |
text |
| author |
KOH, Winston LEE, Kuo Chuen David |
| author_facet |
KOH, Winston LEE, Kuo Chuen David |
| author_sort |
KOH, Winston |
| title |
Auctions for Transferable Objects: Theory and Evidence |
| title_short |
Auctions for Transferable Objects: Theory and Evidence |
| title_full |
Auctions for Transferable Objects: Theory and Evidence |
| title_fullStr |
Auctions for Transferable Objects: Theory and Evidence |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Auctions for Transferable Objects: Theory and Evidence |
| title_sort |
auctions for transferable objects: theory and evidence |
| publisher |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
| publishDate |
1992 |
| url |
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3404 |
| _version_ |
1770571419746304000 |