Search for Optimal CEO Compensation: Theory and Empirical Evidence
We integrate an agency model with dynamic search equilibrium to study three important issues concerning executive compensation. We show that 1) the equilibrium pay-to-performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm’s specific risk, and negatively on its systematic risk, which offers a plausible...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| 格式: | text |
| 語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2008
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3809 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/4808/viewcontent/ceo_search_April2010.pdf |
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| 機構: | Singapore Management University |
| 語言: | English |