Optimal CEO Compensation with Search: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Optimal CEO Compensation with Search: Theory and Empirical Evidence

We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contra...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: CAO, Melanie, WANG, Rong
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
Subjects:
executive compensation
agency problem
chief executive officers
market equilibrium
Corporate Finance
Human Resources Management
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3238
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/4237/viewcontent/WangRong2013Mayjffinal_ceo.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3238
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/4237/viewcontent/WangRong2013Mayjffinal_ceo.pdf

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