Optimal CEO Compensation with Search: Theory and Empirical Evidence
We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contra...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2013
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3238 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/4237/viewcontent/WangRong2013Mayjffinal_ceo.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |