Ownership and Voting Power in Germany

This paper analyses the voting control structure of industrial firms listed on the official market in Germany. Voting control is highly concentrated and few companies are widely held. Widely held companies typically have takeover defences in place, but these are increasingly eroded by the control an...

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Main Authors: Becht, Marco, BOEHMER, Ekkehart
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2001
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/4718
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spelling sg-smu-ink.lkcsb_research-57172016-03-05T15:39:26Z Ownership and Voting Power in Germany Becht, Marco BOEHMER, Ekkehart This paper analyses the voting control structure of industrial firms listed on the official market in Germany. Voting control is highly concentrated and few companies are widely held. Widely held companies typically have takeover defences in place, but these are increasingly eroded by the control and transparency law. 2001-01-01T08:00:00Z text https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/4718 info:doi/10.1093/0199257531.003.0005 Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Corporations voting power Germany corporate control corporate governance ownership takeover defences voting control Business Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Corporate Finance
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Corporations
voting power
Germany
corporate control
corporate governance
ownership
takeover defences
voting control
Business
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Corporate Finance
spellingShingle Corporations
voting power
Germany
corporate control
corporate governance
ownership
takeover defences
voting control
Business
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Corporate Finance
Becht, Marco
BOEHMER, Ekkehart
Ownership and Voting Power in Germany
description This paper analyses the voting control structure of industrial firms listed on the official market in Germany. Voting control is highly concentrated and few companies are widely held. Widely held companies typically have takeover defences in place, but these are increasingly eroded by the control and transparency law.
format text
author Becht, Marco
BOEHMER, Ekkehart
author_facet Becht, Marco
BOEHMER, Ekkehart
author_sort Becht, Marco
title Ownership and Voting Power in Germany
title_short Ownership and Voting Power in Germany
title_full Ownership and Voting Power in Germany
title_fullStr Ownership and Voting Power in Germany
title_full_unstemmed Ownership and Voting Power in Germany
title_sort ownership and voting power in germany
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2001
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/4718
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