Socially responsible firms

In the corporate finance tradition, starting with Berle and Means (1932), corporations should generally be run to maximize shareholder value. The agency view of corporate social responsibility (CSR) considers CSR an agency problem and a waste of corporate resources. Given our identification strategy...

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Main Authors: FERRELL, Allen, Hao LIANG, RENNEBOOG, Luc
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2016
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5004
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6003/viewcontent/SociallyResponsibleFirms_JFE_final.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
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spelling sg-smu-ink.lkcsb_research-60032017-03-29T09:39:15Z Socially responsible firms FERRELL, Allen Hao LIANG, RENNEBOOG, Luc In the corporate finance tradition, starting with Berle and Means (1932), corporations should generally be run to maximize shareholder value. The agency view of corporate social responsibility (CSR) considers CSR an agency problem and a waste of corporate resources. Given our identification strategy by means of an instrumental variable approach, we find that well-governed firms that suffer less from agency concerns (less cash abundance, positive pay-for-performance, small control wedge, strong minority protection) engage more in CSR. We also find that a positive relation exists between CSR and value and that CSR attenuates the negative relation between managerial entrenchment and value. 2016-12-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5004 info:doi/10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.12.003 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6003/viewcontent/SociallyResponsibleFirms_JFE_final.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Corporate social responsibility Agency costs Corporate governance Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Corporate Finance
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Corporate social responsibility
Agency costs
Corporate governance
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Corporate Finance
spellingShingle Corporate social responsibility
Agency costs
Corporate governance
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Corporate Finance
FERRELL, Allen
Hao LIANG,
RENNEBOOG, Luc
Socially responsible firms
description In the corporate finance tradition, starting with Berle and Means (1932), corporations should generally be run to maximize shareholder value. The agency view of corporate social responsibility (CSR) considers CSR an agency problem and a waste of corporate resources. Given our identification strategy by means of an instrumental variable approach, we find that well-governed firms that suffer less from agency concerns (less cash abundance, positive pay-for-performance, small control wedge, strong minority protection) engage more in CSR. We also find that a positive relation exists between CSR and value and that CSR attenuates the negative relation between managerial entrenchment and value.
format text
author FERRELL, Allen
Hao LIANG,
RENNEBOOG, Luc
author_facet FERRELL, Allen
Hao LIANG,
RENNEBOOG, Luc
author_sort FERRELL, Allen
title Socially responsible firms
title_short Socially responsible firms
title_full Socially responsible firms
title_fullStr Socially responsible firms
title_full_unstemmed Socially responsible firms
title_sort socially responsible firms
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2016
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5004
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6003/viewcontent/SociallyResponsibleFirms_JFE_final.pdf
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