Portfolio manager compensation and mutual fund performance
We use a novel dataset to study the relation between individual portfolio manager compensation and mutual fund performance. Managers with explicit performance-based pay exhibit superior subsequent fund performance, especially when investment advisors link pay to performance over a longer time period...
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Main Authors: | , , |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2016
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5169 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6168/viewcontent/SSRN_id2024027.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
Summary: | We use a novel dataset to study the relation between individual portfolio manager compensation and mutual fund performance. Managers with explicit performance-based pay exhibit superior subsequent fund performance, especially when investment advisors link pay to performance over a longer time period. In contrast, alternative compensation arrangements, such as fixed salary, assets-based pay, or advisor-profits-based pay are not associated with superior performance. Our tests further show that the positive relation between performance-based contracts and fund performance is not driven by the selection of talented managers proxied by education background. Lastly, managers with performance-based pay engage less in risk-shifting activities. |
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