Portfolio manager compensation and mutual fund performance

We use a novel dataset to study the relation between individual portfolio manager compensation and mutual fund performance. Managers with explicit performance-based pay exhibit superior subsequent fund performance, especially when investment advisors link pay to performance over a longer time period...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: MA, Linlin, YUEHUA TANG, GOMEZ, Juan-Pedro
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2016
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5169
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/6168/viewcontent/SSRN_id2024027.pdf
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English
Description
Summary:We use a novel dataset to study the relation between individual portfolio manager compensation and mutual fund performance. Managers with explicit performance-based pay exhibit superior subsequent fund performance, especially when investment advisors link pay to performance over a longer time period. In contrast, alternative compensation arrangements, such as fixed salary, assets-based pay, or advisor-profits-based pay are not associated with superior performance. Our tests further show that the positive relation between performance-based contracts and fund performance is not driven by the selection of talented managers proxied by education background. Lastly, managers with performance-based pay engage less in risk-shifting activities.