Don't blame me: The effects of CEO power, board affiliation, and Sarbanes-Oxley on CEO turnover following financial misrepresentation
I examine the conditions under which CEOs are terminated as an outcome of firm financial restatements. I find that chief executive‘s power acts to limit terminations,especially in cases of more severe restatements, while board members most closely affiliated with the CEO appear to avoid the stigma o...
محفوظ في:
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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| التنسيق: | text |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2011
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/6016 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/7015/viewcontent/DontBlameMe_SWAM_2011_pvoa.pdf |
| الوسوم: |
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