Don't blame me: The effects of CEO power, board affiliation, and Sarbanes-Oxley on CEO turnover following financial misrepresentation
I examine the conditions under which CEOs are terminated as an outcome of firm financial restatements. I find that chief executive‘s power acts to limit terminations,especially in cases of more severe restatements, while board members most closely affiliated with the CEO appear to avoid the stigma o...
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Main Author: | GOMULYA, David |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2011
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/6016 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/7015/viewcontent/DontBlameMe_SWAM_2011_pvoa.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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