Potential pilot problems: Treatment spillovers in financial regulatory experiments
In analyzing regulatory experiments, a fundamental assumption is that the control group is unaffected. However, in many settings, this assumption may not hold. Generally, the total effect of a regulatory change consists of direct and indirect effects, but the standard difference-in-difference approa...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2020
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/6229 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/7228/viewcontent/Potential_pilot_problems_pv.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | In analyzing regulatory experiments, a fundamental assumption is that the control group is unaffected. However, in many settings, this assumption may not hold. Generally, the total effect of a regulatory change consists of direct and indirect effects, but the standard difference-in-difference approach measures only direct effects. We apply our methods to the 2007 repeal of the uptick rule by the SEC. The indirect effects are substantial, because unlike the 2005 partial repeal, total repeal enables aggressive portfolio shorting. In particular, we find that short sellers become much more aggressive across the board, and shorting activity increases, even in control stocks where the uptick rule was already suspended. The 2007 repeal also causes increased price efficiency and slightly worse liquidity. We conclude that regulatory pilot designers should carefully consider potential spillovers. |
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