Technology specifications and production timing in a co-opetitive supply chain

Motivated by Google’s technology specifications on Android devices, we consider firms’ decisions on production timing in a co-opetitive supply chain comprising a manufacturer and an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), where the manufacturer acts as the OEM’s upstream contract manufacturer and dow...

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Main Authors: NIU, Baozhuang, CHEN, Kanglin, FANG, Xin, YUE, Xiaohang, WANG, Xin
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2019
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/6240
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/7239/viewcontent/co_opetitive_supply_chain_sv.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.lkcsb_research-72392019-09-11T06:04:22Z Technology specifications and production timing in a co-opetitive supply chain NIU, Baozhuang CHEN, Kanglin FANG, Xin YUE, Xiaohang WANG, Xin Motivated by Google’s technology specifications on Android devices, we consider firms’ decisions on production timing in a co-opetitive supply chain comprising a manufacturer and an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), where the manufacturer acts as the OEM’s upstream contract manufacturer and downstream competitor. We consider the market acceptance uncertainty of key product designs. If a firm decides to implement ex post production strategy (PS), it can delay the production until the market acceptance uncertainty of its product is resolved. Otherwise, ex-ante production strategy (AS) is implemented. We find that, due to the co-opetition, PS does not always benefit either the manufacturer or the OEM, because the value of delayed production is diminished as the competitor may commit a production quantity earlier under AS. Further, firms’ decisions on production timing are dependent on the degree of market acceptance uncertainty of their products and competition intensity. We find that both firms choose PS when uncertainty is high, while only one of them chooses PS when uncertainty is moderate or low. Interestingly, when the competition is intense, the manufacturer tends to choose PS, which can benefit from both the resolved market acceptance uncertainty and OEM’s early commitment of production quantity. © 2019 Production and Operations Management Society 2019-08-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/6240 info:doi/10.1111/poms.13031 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/7239/viewcontent/co_opetitive_supply_chain_sv.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Co-opetition Market acceptance Production timing Technology specifications Operations and Supply Chain Management Technology and Innovation
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Co-opetition
Market acceptance
Production timing
Technology specifications
Operations and Supply Chain Management
Technology and Innovation
spellingShingle Co-opetition
Market acceptance
Production timing
Technology specifications
Operations and Supply Chain Management
Technology and Innovation
NIU, Baozhuang
CHEN, Kanglin
FANG, Xin
YUE, Xiaohang
WANG, Xin
Technology specifications and production timing in a co-opetitive supply chain
description Motivated by Google’s technology specifications on Android devices, we consider firms’ decisions on production timing in a co-opetitive supply chain comprising a manufacturer and an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), where the manufacturer acts as the OEM’s upstream contract manufacturer and downstream competitor. We consider the market acceptance uncertainty of key product designs. If a firm decides to implement ex post production strategy (PS), it can delay the production until the market acceptance uncertainty of its product is resolved. Otherwise, ex-ante production strategy (AS) is implemented. We find that, due to the co-opetition, PS does not always benefit either the manufacturer or the OEM, because the value of delayed production is diminished as the competitor may commit a production quantity earlier under AS. Further, firms’ decisions on production timing are dependent on the degree of market acceptance uncertainty of their products and competition intensity. We find that both firms choose PS when uncertainty is high, while only one of them chooses PS when uncertainty is moderate or low. Interestingly, when the competition is intense, the manufacturer tends to choose PS, which can benefit from both the resolved market acceptance uncertainty and OEM’s early commitment of production quantity. © 2019 Production and Operations Management Society
format text
author NIU, Baozhuang
CHEN, Kanglin
FANG, Xin
YUE, Xiaohang
WANG, Xin
author_facet NIU, Baozhuang
CHEN, Kanglin
FANG, Xin
YUE, Xiaohang
WANG, Xin
author_sort NIU, Baozhuang
title Technology specifications and production timing in a co-opetitive supply chain
title_short Technology specifications and production timing in a co-opetitive supply chain
title_full Technology specifications and production timing in a co-opetitive supply chain
title_fullStr Technology specifications and production timing in a co-opetitive supply chain
title_full_unstemmed Technology specifications and production timing in a co-opetitive supply chain
title_sort technology specifications and production timing in a co-opetitive supply chain
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2019
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/6240
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/7239/viewcontent/co_opetitive_supply_chain_sv.pdf
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