Identifying ineffective monitors from securities class action lawsuits
We identify “ineffective” institutional monitors based on the prevalence of occurrences of securities class-action lawsuits in their overall portfolio. We find that firms with a higher representation of such institutional investors among the firms’ large shareholders have a greater likelihood of fut...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2018
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/6573 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/7572/viewcontent/Identifying_ineffective_monitors_from_securities_class_action_lawsuits_wp.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | We identify “ineffective” institutional monitors based on the prevalence of occurrences of securities class-action lawsuits in their overall portfolio. We find that firms with a higher representation of such institutional investors among the firms’ large shareholders have a greater likelihood of future litigation and experience more negative market reactions upon such litigation filings. These firms exhibit other unfavorable governance outcomes including poorer acquisitions and lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. We find suggestive evidence that ineffective monitoring may be a result of higher operational risk. |
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