The invisible hand of short selling: Does short selling discipline earnings management?
We hypothesize that short selling has a disciplining role vis-a-vis firm managers that forces them to reduce earnings management. Using firm-level short-selling data for thirty-three countries collected over a sample period from 2002 to 2009, we document a significantly negative relationship between...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| 格式: | text |
| 語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2015
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/7054 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/8053/viewcontent/hhu147.pdf |
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| 機構: | Singapore Management University |
| 語言: | English |
| 總結: | We hypothesize that short selling has a disciplining role vis-a-vis firm managers that forces them to reduce earnings management. Using firm-level short-selling data for thirty-three countries collected over a sample period from 2002 to 2009, we document a significantly negative relationship between the threat of short selling and earnings management. Tests based on instrumental variable and exogenous regulatory experiments offer evidence of a causal link between short selling and earnings management. Our findings suggest that short selling functions as an external governance mechanism to discipline managers. |
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