Riding off into the sunset: Dual-class structure in the age of unicorns going public
The increasing adoption of dual-class shares (DCS)—an ownership structure that gives corporate insiders greater voting power than other shareholders—among newly listed companies has raisedsignificant governance concerns. We investigate the decision to adopt the DCS structure and itsvalue implication...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2022
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/7148 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/8147/viewcontent/SSRN_id4242984.pdf |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | The increasing adoption of dual-class shares (DCS)—an ownership structure that gives corporate insiders greater voting power than other shareholders—among newly listed companies has raisedsignificant governance concerns. We investigate the decision to adopt the DCS structure and itsvalue implications in the recent U.S. IPOs. Using founder cultural traits and Silicon Valley lawfirms as instrumental variables, we find significant post-IPO outperformance by firms adopting DCSwith a sunset clause, especially incapacity-based sunset which stipulates that the DCS will ceaseafter founders’ death, incapacitation or departure, compared to non-DCS firms and DCS firms without sunsets. This outperformance is more pronounced for high-tech firms, after Google’s IPO, and for firms that rely more on R&D. DCS firms with sunset provisions have greater operating efficiency, marginal value of cash, and more innovation outputs but lower quality ones, which is in line with the incentive schemes provided to their executives. |
|---|