The deterrence effects of vicarious punishments on corporate financial fraud

This study extends the research on corporate financial fraud by developing a new perspective on the deterrence effects of vicarious punishments premised on social learning theory. We posit that firms vicariously learn about punishments from their peers by picking up modeling cues, environmental cues...

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Main Authors: YIU, Daphne W., XU, Yuehua, WAN, William P.
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2014
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/7322
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/8321/viewcontent/Deterrence_effects_of_vicarious_punishments_on_corporate_financial_fraud.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.lkcsb_research-83212023-11-10T07:47:51Z The deterrence effects of vicarious punishments on corporate financial fraud YIU, Daphne W. XU, Yuehua WAN, William P. This study extends the research on corporate financial fraud by developing a new perspective on the deterrence effects of vicarious punishments premised on social learning theory. We posit that firms vicariously learn about punishments from their peers by picking up modeling cues, environmental cues, and social cues in the inhibitive learning process, thus being deterred from committing future fraudulence. Using a matched sample of 604 observations of Chinese listed firms between 2002 and 2008, our findings show that an observing firm is deterred from committing fraud if the peers in its industry are caught and punished. We further find that such deterrence effects are subject to how the observing firm evaluates the possibility of being caught and the likelihood it will be punished the same way if it violates similar prohibitions. In particular, inhibitive learning effects are positively moderated by punishments of prominent firms and model-observer similarity but negatively attenuated by the development of the legal system. Our study sheds light on the corporate fraud literature by illuminating the indirect, inhibitive learning process from vicarious punishments and identifying the conditions for differential learning/deterrence outcomes of the observing firms. 2014-09-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/7322 info:doi/10.1287/orsc.2014.0904 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/8321/viewcontent/Deterrence_effects_of_vicarious_punishments_on_corporate_financial_fraud.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Vicarious learning; Corporate financial fraud; Corporate governance; Social learning theory; Deterrence; China Corporate Finance
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Vicarious learning; Corporate financial fraud; Corporate governance; Social learning theory; Deterrence; China
Corporate Finance
spellingShingle Vicarious learning; Corporate financial fraud; Corporate governance; Social learning theory; Deterrence; China
Corporate Finance
YIU, Daphne W.
XU, Yuehua
WAN, William P.
The deterrence effects of vicarious punishments on corporate financial fraud
description This study extends the research on corporate financial fraud by developing a new perspective on the deterrence effects of vicarious punishments premised on social learning theory. We posit that firms vicariously learn about punishments from their peers by picking up modeling cues, environmental cues, and social cues in the inhibitive learning process, thus being deterred from committing future fraudulence. Using a matched sample of 604 observations of Chinese listed firms between 2002 and 2008, our findings show that an observing firm is deterred from committing fraud if the peers in its industry are caught and punished. We further find that such deterrence effects are subject to how the observing firm evaluates the possibility of being caught and the likelihood it will be punished the same way if it violates similar prohibitions. In particular, inhibitive learning effects are positively moderated by punishments of prominent firms and model-observer similarity but negatively attenuated by the development of the legal system. Our study sheds light on the corporate fraud literature by illuminating the indirect, inhibitive learning process from vicarious punishments and identifying the conditions for differential learning/deterrence outcomes of the observing firms.
format text
author YIU, Daphne W.
XU, Yuehua
WAN, William P.
author_facet YIU, Daphne W.
XU, Yuehua
WAN, William P.
author_sort YIU, Daphne W.
title The deterrence effects of vicarious punishments on corporate financial fraud
title_short The deterrence effects of vicarious punishments on corporate financial fraud
title_full The deterrence effects of vicarious punishments on corporate financial fraud
title_fullStr The deterrence effects of vicarious punishments on corporate financial fraud
title_full_unstemmed The deterrence effects of vicarious punishments on corporate financial fraud
title_sort deterrence effects of vicarious punishments on corporate financial fraud
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2014
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/7322
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/lkcsb_research/article/8321/viewcontent/Deterrence_effects_of_vicarious_punishments_on_corporate_financial_fraud.pdf
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