On the Untraceability of Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol with Constant Key-Lookup

In ASIACCS'08, Burmester, Medeiros and Motta proposed an anonymous RFID authentication protocol (BMM protocol [2]) that preserves the security and privacy properties, and achieves better scalability compared with other contemporary approaches. We analyze BMM protocol and find that some of secur...

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Main Authors: LIANG, Bing, LI, Yingjiu, LI, Tieyan, DENG, Robert H.
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2009
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/499
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/1498/viewcontent/On_the_Untraceability_of_Anonymous_rfid_auntehtication_protocol_with_constant_key_lookup.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sis_research-14982020-01-03T13:44:46Z On the Untraceability of Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol with Constant Key-Lookup LIANG, Bing LI, Yingjiu LI, Tieyan DENG, Robert H. In ASIACCS'08, Burmester, Medeiros and Motta proposed an anonymous RFID authentication protocol (BMM protocol [2]) that preserves the security and privacy properties, and achieves better scalability compared with other contemporary approaches. We analyze BMM protocol and find that some of security properties (especial untraceability) are not fulfilled as originally claimed. We consider a subtle attack, in which an adversary can manipulate the messages transmitted between a tag and a reader for several continuous protocol runs, and can successfully trace the tag after these interactions. Our attack works under a weak adversary model, in which an adversary can eavesdrop, intercept and replay the protocol messages, while stronger assumptions such as physically compromising of the secret on a tag, are not necessary. Based on our attack, more advanced attacking strategy can be designed on cracking a whole RFID-enabled supply chain if BMM protocol is implemented. To counteract such flaw, we improve the BMM protocol so that it maintains all the security and efficiency properties as claimed in [2]. 2009-12-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/499 info:doi/10.1007/978-3-642-10772-6_7 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/1498/viewcontent/On_the_Untraceability_of_Anonymous_rfid_auntehtication_protocol_with_constant_key_lookup.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Anonymous Authentication Privacy RFID Information Security
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Anonymous
Authentication
Privacy
RFID
Information Security
spellingShingle Anonymous
Authentication
Privacy
RFID
Information Security
LIANG, Bing
LI, Yingjiu
LI, Tieyan
DENG, Robert H.
On the Untraceability of Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol with Constant Key-Lookup
description In ASIACCS'08, Burmester, Medeiros and Motta proposed an anonymous RFID authentication protocol (BMM protocol [2]) that preserves the security and privacy properties, and achieves better scalability compared with other contemporary approaches. We analyze BMM protocol and find that some of security properties (especial untraceability) are not fulfilled as originally claimed. We consider a subtle attack, in which an adversary can manipulate the messages transmitted between a tag and a reader for several continuous protocol runs, and can successfully trace the tag after these interactions. Our attack works under a weak adversary model, in which an adversary can eavesdrop, intercept and replay the protocol messages, while stronger assumptions such as physically compromising of the secret on a tag, are not necessary. Based on our attack, more advanced attacking strategy can be designed on cracking a whole RFID-enabled supply chain if BMM protocol is implemented. To counteract such flaw, we improve the BMM protocol so that it maintains all the security and efficiency properties as claimed in [2].
format text
author LIANG, Bing
LI, Yingjiu
LI, Tieyan
DENG, Robert H.
author_facet LIANG, Bing
LI, Yingjiu
LI, Tieyan
DENG, Robert H.
author_sort LIANG, Bing
title On the Untraceability of Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol with Constant Key-Lookup
title_short On the Untraceability of Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol with Constant Key-Lookup
title_full On the Untraceability of Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol with Constant Key-Lookup
title_fullStr On the Untraceability of Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol with Constant Key-Lookup
title_full_unstemmed On the Untraceability of Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol with Constant Key-Lookup
title_sort on the untraceability of anonymous rfid authentication protocol with constant key-lookup
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2009
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/499
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/1498/viewcontent/On_the_Untraceability_of_Anonymous_rfid_auntehtication_protocol_with_constant_key_lookup.pdf
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