Setting discrete bid levels adaptively in repeated auctions

The success of an auction design often hinges on its ability to set parameters such as reserve price and bid levels that will maximize an objective function such as the auctioneer revenue. Works on designing adaptive auction mechanisms have emerged recently, and the challenge is in learning differen...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: ZHANG, Jilian, LAU, Hoong Chuin, SHEN, Jialie
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2009
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/517
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/1516/viewcontent/p195_zhang.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English