Setting discrete bid levels adaptively in repeated auctions
The success of an auction design often hinges on its ability to set parameters such as reserve price and bid levels that will maximize an objective function such as the auctioneer revenue. Works on designing adaptive auction mechanisms have emerged recently, and the challenge is in learning differen...
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Main Authors: | , , |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2009
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/517 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/1516/viewcontent/p195_zhang.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |