Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation
Agents in a peer-to-peer system typically have incentives to influence its network structure, either to reduce their costs or increase their ability to capture value. The problem is compounded when agents can join and leave the system dynamically. This paper proposes three economic mechanisms that o...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2003
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/825 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/1824/viewcontent/woodard03adhoc.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | Agents in a peer-to-peer system typically have incentives to influence its network structure, either to reduce their costs or increase their ability to capture value. The problem is compounded when agents can join and leave the system dynamically. This paper proposes three economic mechanisms that offset the incentives for strategic behavior and facilitate the formation of networks with desirable global properties. |
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