Cryptanalysis of a Digital Signature Scheme on ID-Based Key-Sharing Infrastructures

At ISW’99, Nishioka, Hanaoka and Imai proposed a digital signature scheme on ID-based key-sharing infrastructures. That signature scheme is claimed to be secure if the discrete logarithm problem is hard to solve. Two schemes (the ID-type and the random-type schemes) based on the linear scheme for th...

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Main Authors: WU, Hongjun, BAO, Feng, DENG, Robert H.
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2001
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1105
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2104/viewcontent/Wu2001_CryptanalysisOfADigitalSignature_pv.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sis_research-21042022-02-18T05:26:35Z Cryptanalysis of a Digital Signature Scheme on ID-Based Key-Sharing Infrastructures WU, Hongjun BAO, Feng DENG, Robert H. At ISW’99, Nishioka, Hanaoka and Imai proposed a digital signature scheme on ID-based key-sharing infrastructures. That signature scheme is claimed to be secure if the discrete logarithm problem is hard to solve. Two schemes (the ID-type and the random-type schemes) based on the linear scheme for the Key Predistribution Systems (KPS) and the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) were given. In this paper we show that those two schemes fail to meet the nonrepudiation requirement: with negligible amount of computation, a signature could be forged. For the ID-type signature scheme, any verifier could forge a signature to raise repudiation between that verifier and the signer. The random type signature scheme has the same weakness. Furthermore, for the random-type signature scheme, once a signer issued a signature, anyone (not only the user in the scheme) could forge that signer's signature for a n arbitrary message. 2001-02-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1105 info:doi/10.1007/3-540-44586-2_13 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2104/viewcontent/Wu2001_CryptanalysisOfADigitalSignature_pv.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Computation theory Cryptography Electronic document identification systems Public key cryptography Digital signature schemes Discrete logarithm problems ID-based Key pre-distribution Key sharing Non-repudiation Signature Scheme Information Security
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Computation theory
Cryptography
Electronic document identification systems
Public key cryptography
Digital signature schemes
Discrete logarithm problems
ID-based
Key pre-distribution
Key sharing
Non-repudiation
Signature Scheme
Information Security
spellingShingle Computation theory
Cryptography
Electronic document identification systems
Public key cryptography
Digital signature schemes
Discrete logarithm problems
ID-based
Key pre-distribution
Key sharing
Non-repudiation
Signature Scheme
Information Security
WU, Hongjun
BAO, Feng
DENG, Robert H.
Cryptanalysis of a Digital Signature Scheme on ID-Based Key-Sharing Infrastructures
description At ISW’99, Nishioka, Hanaoka and Imai proposed a digital signature scheme on ID-based key-sharing infrastructures. That signature scheme is claimed to be secure if the discrete logarithm problem is hard to solve. Two schemes (the ID-type and the random-type schemes) based on the linear scheme for the Key Predistribution Systems (KPS) and the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) were given. In this paper we show that those two schemes fail to meet the nonrepudiation requirement: with negligible amount of computation, a signature could be forged. For the ID-type signature scheme, any verifier could forge a signature to raise repudiation between that verifier and the signer. The random type signature scheme has the same weakness. Furthermore, for the random-type signature scheme, once a signer issued a signature, anyone (not only the user in the scheme) could forge that signer's signature for a n arbitrary message.
format text
author WU, Hongjun
BAO, Feng
DENG, Robert H.
author_facet WU, Hongjun
BAO, Feng
DENG, Robert H.
author_sort WU, Hongjun
title Cryptanalysis of a Digital Signature Scheme on ID-Based Key-Sharing Infrastructures
title_short Cryptanalysis of a Digital Signature Scheme on ID-Based Key-Sharing Infrastructures
title_full Cryptanalysis of a Digital Signature Scheme on ID-Based Key-Sharing Infrastructures
title_fullStr Cryptanalysis of a Digital Signature Scheme on ID-Based Key-Sharing Infrastructures
title_full_unstemmed Cryptanalysis of a Digital Signature Scheme on ID-Based Key-Sharing Infrastructures
title_sort cryptanalysis of a digital signature scheme on id-based key-sharing infrastructures
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2001
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1105
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2104/viewcontent/Wu2001_CryptanalysisOfADigitalSignature_pv.pdf
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