Cryptanalysis of a Digital Signature Scheme on ID-Based Key-Sharing Infrastructures
At ISW’99, Nishioka, Hanaoka and Imai proposed a digital signature scheme on ID-based key-sharing infrastructures. That signature scheme is claimed to be secure if the discrete logarithm problem is hard to solve. Two schemes (the ID-type and the random-type schemes) based on the linear scheme for th...
Saved in:
Main Authors: | , , |
---|---|
Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2001
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1105 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2104/viewcontent/Wu2001_CryptanalysisOfADigitalSignature_pv.pdf |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
id |
sg-smu-ink.sis_research-2104 |
---|---|
record_format |
dspace |
spelling |
sg-smu-ink.sis_research-21042022-02-18T05:26:35Z Cryptanalysis of a Digital Signature Scheme on ID-Based Key-Sharing Infrastructures WU, Hongjun BAO, Feng DENG, Robert H. At ISW’99, Nishioka, Hanaoka and Imai proposed a digital signature scheme on ID-based key-sharing infrastructures. That signature scheme is claimed to be secure if the discrete logarithm problem is hard to solve. Two schemes (the ID-type and the random-type schemes) based on the linear scheme for the Key Predistribution Systems (KPS) and the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) were given. In this paper we show that those two schemes fail to meet the nonrepudiation requirement: with negligible amount of computation, a signature could be forged. For the ID-type signature scheme, any verifier could forge a signature to raise repudiation between that verifier and the signer. The random type signature scheme has the same weakness. Furthermore, for the random-type signature scheme, once a signer issued a signature, anyone (not only the user in the scheme) could forge that signer's signature for a n arbitrary message. 2001-02-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1105 info:doi/10.1007/3-540-44586-2_13 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2104/viewcontent/Wu2001_CryptanalysisOfADigitalSignature_pv.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Computation theory Cryptography Electronic document identification systems Public key cryptography Digital signature schemes Discrete logarithm problems ID-based Key pre-distribution Key sharing Non-repudiation Signature Scheme Information Security |
institution |
Singapore Management University |
building |
SMU Libraries |
continent |
Asia |
country |
Singapore Singapore |
content_provider |
SMU Libraries |
collection |
InK@SMU |
language |
English |
topic |
Computation theory Cryptography Electronic document identification systems Public key cryptography Digital signature schemes Discrete logarithm problems ID-based Key pre-distribution Key sharing Non-repudiation Signature Scheme Information Security |
spellingShingle |
Computation theory Cryptography Electronic document identification systems Public key cryptography Digital signature schemes Discrete logarithm problems ID-based Key pre-distribution Key sharing Non-repudiation Signature Scheme Information Security WU, Hongjun BAO, Feng DENG, Robert H. Cryptanalysis of a Digital Signature Scheme on ID-Based Key-Sharing Infrastructures |
description |
At ISW’99, Nishioka, Hanaoka and Imai proposed a digital signature scheme on ID-based key-sharing infrastructures. That signature scheme is claimed to be secure if the discrete logarithm problem is hard to solve. Two schemes (the ID-type and the random-type schemes) based on the linear scheme for the Key Predistribution Systems (KPS) and the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) were given. In this paper we show that those two schemes fail to meet the nonrepudiation requirement: with negligible amount of computation, a signature could be forged. For the ID-type signature scheme, any verifier could forge a signature to raise repudiation between that verifier and the signer. The random type signature scheme has the same weakness. Furthermore, for the random-type signature scheme, once a signer issued a signature, anyone (not only the user in the scheme) could forge that signer's signature for a n arbitrary message. |
format |
text |
author |
WU, Hongjun BAO, Feng DENG, Robert H. |
author_facet |
WU, Hongjun BAO, Feng DENG, Robert H. |
author_sort |
WU, Hongjun |
title |
Cryptanalysis of a Digital Signature Scheme on ID-Based Key-Sharing Infrastructures |
title_short |
Cryptanalysis of a Digital Signature Scheme on ID-Based Key-Sharing Infrastructures |
title_full |
Cryptanalysis of a Digital Signature Scheme on ID-Based Key-Sharing Infrastructures |
title_fullStr |
Cryptanalysis of a Digital Signature Scheme on ID-Based Key-Sharing Infrastructures |
title_full_unstemmed |
Cryptanalysis of a Digital Signature Scheme on ID-Based Key-Sharing Infrastructures |
title_sort |
cryptanalysis of a digital signature scheme on id-based key-sharing infrastructures |
publisher |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
publishDate |
2001 |
url |
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1105 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2104/viewcontent/Wu2001_CryptanalysisOfADigitalSignature_pv.pdf |
_version_ |
1770570856805695488 |