Cryptanalysis of the m-permutation protection schemes

• Main Authors: WU, Hongjun, BAO, Feng, YE, Dingfeng, DENG, Robert H.
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2000
• Subjects: Public key cryptography; Data privacy; Information protection; Secrecy protection; Security key; Computer security; Information Security
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1111; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2110/viewcontent/Wu2000_CryptanalysisOfTheMPerMutation_pv.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

Anderson and Kuhn have proposed the EEPROM modification attack to recover the secret key stored in the EEPROM. At ACISP ’98, Fung and Gray proposed an m-permutation protection scheme against the EEPROM modification attack. At ACISP ’99, Fung and Gray pointed out that in their original scheme, a secret key with too small or too large Hamming weight could be recovered easily. Then they proposed a revised m- permutation protection scheme and claimed that their revised scheme does not leak any information of the secret key. In this paper, we break completely both the original and the revised m-permutation protection schemes. The original scheme is broken with about 2log2 n devices from the same batch and about (3log2 n +2 ) ×m ×n probes (n is the length of the secret key and m is the amount of permutations). The revised m-permutation protection scheme is more vulnerable than the original one. It could be broken with only one device and about m ×n 3/3 probes.