A Secure Extension of the Kwak-Moon Group Signcryption Scheme

This paper presents the secure extension of the Kwak–Moon group signcryption scheme [Kwak D, Moon S. Efficient distributed signcryption scheme as group signcryption. In: First applied cryptography and network security – ACNS'03. Lecturer notes in computer science, vol. 2846. Springer Verlag-Ver...

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Main Authors: KWAK, D., Moon, S. J., WANG, Guilin, DENG, Robert H.
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2006
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1199
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2006.05.006
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sis_research-21982011-01-24T06:21:45Z A Secure Extension of the Kwak-Moon Group Signcryption Scheme KWAK, D. Moon, S. J. WANG, Guilin DENG, Robert H. This paper presents the secure extension of the Kwak–Moon group signcryption scheme [Kwak D, Moon S. Efficient distributed signcryption scheme as group signcryption. In: First applied cryptography and network security – ACNS'03. Lecturer notes in computer science, vol. 2846. Springer Verlag-Verlag; 2003. p. 403–17] as a countermeasure against the cryptanalysis in [Wang G, Deng RH, Kwak D, Moon S. Security analysis of two signcryption scheme. In: Information security conference – ISC 2004. Lecturer notes in computer science, vol. 3225. Springer Verlag-Verlag; 2004. p. 123–33]. The cryptanalysis revealed that the Kwak–Moon scheme cannot satisfy the properties of unforgeability, coalition-resistance, and traceability. Therefore, to avoid these weaknesses, while providing the same functions, we add confidentiality to the original group signature by distributing a shared secret among group members through an efficient group key agreement. However, in case of just combining a group signature and a group key agreement, if an attacker who does not belong to the group acquires a valid group signature, it is still possible for him to impersonate a valid group member and delegate the group. Thus, to avoid this possibility, the proposed scheme confirms whether or not the sender is equal to the signer by including a session key encryption in the signed message. In addition, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme and apply it to an anonymous statistical survey of attributes. 2006-09-01T07:00:00Z text https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1199 info:doi/10.1016/j.cose.2006.05.006 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2006.05.006 Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Signature Group signature Signcryption Public-key cryptography Key agreement Information Security
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Signature
Group signature
Signcryption
Public-key cryptography
Key agreement
Information Security
spellingShingle Signature
Group signature
Signcryption
Public-key cryptography
Key agreement
Information Security
KWAK, D.
Moon, S. J.
WANG, Guilin
DENG, Robert H.
A Secure Extension of the Kwak-Moon Group Signcryption Scheme
description This paper presents the secure extension of the Kwak–Moon group signcryption scheme [Kwak D, Moon S. Efficient distributed signcryption scheme as group signcryption. In: First applied cryptography and network security – ACNS'03. Lecturer notes in computer science, vol. 2846. Springer Verlag-Verlag; 2003. p. 403–17] as a countermeasure against the cryptanalysis in [Wang G, Deng RH, Kwak D, Moon S. Security analysis of two signcryption scheme. In: Information security conference – ISC 2004. Lecturer notes in computer science, vol. 3225. Springer Verlag-Verlag; 2004. p. 123–33]. The cryptanalysis revealed that the Kwak–Moon scheme cannot satisfy the properties of unforgeability, coalition-resistance, and traceability. Therefore, to avoid these weaknesses, while providing the same functions, we add confidentiality to the original group signature by distributing a shared secret among group members through an efficient group key agreement. However, in case of just combining a group signature and a group key agreement, if an attacker who does not belong to the group acquires a valid group signature, it is still possible for him to impersonate a valid group member and delegate the group. Thus, to avoid this possibility, the proposed scheme confirms whether or not the sender is equal to the signer by including a session key encryption in the signed message. In addition, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme and apply it to an anonymous statistical survey of attributes.
format text
author KWAK, D.
Moon, S. J.
WANG, Guilin
DENG, Robert H.
author_facet KWAK, D.
Moon, S. J.
WANG, Guilin
DENG, Robert H.
author_sort KWAK, D.
title A Secure Extension of the Kwak-Moon Group Signcryption Scheme
title_short A Secure Extension of the Kwak-Moon Group Signcryption Scheme
title_full A Secure Extension of the Kwak-Moon Group Signcryption Scheme
title_fullStr A Secure Extension of the Kwak-Moon Group Signcryption Scheme
title_full_unstemmed A Secure Extension of the Kwak-Moon Group Signcryption Scheme
title_sort secure extension of the kwak-moon group signcryption scheme
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2006
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1199
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2006.05.006
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