A Secure Extension of the Kwak-Moon Group Signcryption Scheme
This paper presents the secure extension of the Kwak–Moon group signcryption scheme [Kwak D, Moon S. Efficient distributed signcryption scheme as group signcryption. In: First applied cryptography and network security – ACNS'03. Lecturer notes in computer science, vol. 2846. Springer Verlag-Ver...
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sg-smu-ink.sis_research-21982011-01-24T06:21:45Z A Secure Extension of the Kwak-Moon Group Signcryption Scheme KWAK, D. Moon, S. J. WANG, Guilin DENG, Robert H. This paper presents the secure extension of the Kwak–Moon group signcryption scheme [Kwak D, Moon S. Efficient distributed signcryption scheme as group signcryption. In: First applied cryptography and network security – ACNS'03. Lecturer notes in computer science, vol. 2846. Springer Verlag-Verlag; 2003. p. 403–17] as a countermeasure against the cryptanalysis in [Wang G, Deng RH, Kwak D, Moon S. Security analysis of two signcryption scheme. In: Information security conference – ISC 2004. Lecturer notes in computer science, vol. 3225. Springer Verlag-Verlag; 2004. p. 123–33]. The cryptanalysis revealed that the Kwak–Moon scheme cannot satisfy the properties of unforgeability, coalition-resistance, and traceability. Therefore, to avoid these weaknesses, while providing the same functions, we add confidentiality to the original group signature by distributing a shared secret among group members through an efficient group key agreement. However, in case of just combining a group signature and a group key agreement, if an attacker who does not belong to the group acquires a valid group signature, it is still possible for him to impersonate a valid group member and delegate the group. Thus, to avoid this possibility, the proposed scheme confirms whether or not the sender is equal to the signer by including a session key encryption in the signed message. In addition, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme and apply it to an anonymous statistical survey of attributes. 2006-09-01T07:00:00Z text https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1199 info:doi/10.1016/j.cose.2006.05.006 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2006.05.006 Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Signature Group signature Signcryption Public-key cryptography Key agreement Information Security |
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This paper presents the secure extension of the Kwak–Moon group signcryption scheme [Kwak D, Moon S. Efficient distributed signcryption scheme as group signcryption. In: First applied cryptography and network security – ACNS'03. Lecturer notes in computer science, vol. 2846. Springer Verlag-Verlag; 2003. p. 403–17] as a countermeasure against the cryptanalysis in [Wang G, Deng RH, Kwak D, Moon S. Security analysis of two signcryption scheme. In: Information security conference – ISC 2004. Lecturer notes in computer science, vol. 3225. Springer Verlag-Verlag; 2004. p. 123–33]. The cryptanalysis revealed that the Kwak–Moon scheme cannot satisfy the properties of unforgeability, coalition-resistance, and traceability. Therefore, to avoid these weaknesses, while providing the same functions, we add confidentiality to the original group signature by distributing a shared secret among group members through an efficient group key agreement. However, in case of just combining a group signature and a group key agreement, if an attacker who does not belong to the group acquires a valid group signature, it is still possible for him to impersonate a valid group member and delegate the group. Thus, to avoid this possibility, the proposed scheme confirms whether or not the sender is equal to the signer by including a session key encryption in the signed message. In addition, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme and apply it to an anonymous statistical survey of attributes. |
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KWAK, D. Moon, S. J. WANG, Guilin DENG, Robert H. |
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KWAK, D. Moon, S. J. WANG, Guilin DENG, Robert H. |
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KWAK, D. |
title |
A Secure Extension of the Kwak-Moon Group Signcryption Scheme |
title_short |
A Secure Extension of the Kwak-Moon Group Signcryption Scheme |
title_full |
A Secure Extension of the Kwak-Moon Group Signcryption Scheme |
title_fullStr |
A Secure Extension of the Kwak-Moon Group Signcryption Scheme |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Secure Extension of the Kwak-Moon Group Signcryption Scheme |
title_sort |
secure extension of the kwak-moon group signcryption scheme |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
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2006 |
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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1199 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2006.05.006 |
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1770570895318843392 |