Approximate strategic reasoning through hierarchical reduction of large symmetric games
To deal with exponential growth in the size of a game with the number of agents, we propose an approximation based on a hierarchy of reduced games. The reduced game achieves savings by restricting the number of agents playing any strategy to fixed multiples. We validate the idea through experiments...
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Main Authors: | WELLMAN, Michael P., REEVES, Daniel M., LOCHNER, Kevin M., CHENG, Shih-Fen, SURI, Rahul |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2005
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Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1200 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2199/viewcontent/10.1.1.368.6230.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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