Notes on Equilibria in Symmetric Games
In a symmetric game, every player is identical with respect to the game rules. We show that a symmetric 2strategy game must have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We also discuss Nash’s original paper and its generalized notion of symmetry in games. As a special case of Nash’s theorem, any finite sy...
Saved in:
Main Authors: | CHENG, Shih-Fen, REEVES, Daniel M., VOROBEYCHIK, Yevgeniy, WELLMAN, Michael P. |
---|---|
Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2004
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1213 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2212/viewcontent/ChengSF_2004_EquilibriaSymmetricGames.pdf |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
Similar Items
-
Approximate strategic reasoning through hierarchical reduction of large symmetric games
by: WELLMAN, Michael P., et al.
Published: (2005) -
Iterated Weaker-than-Weak Dominance
by: CHENG, Shih-Fen, et al.
Published: (2007) -
Game-Theoretic Approaches for Complex Systems Optimization
by: CHENG, Shih-Fen
Published: (2007) -
Designing the Market Game for a Commodity Trading Simulation
by: CHENG, Shih-Fen
Published: (2007) -
Uncertain Congestion Games with Assorted Human Agent Populations
by: AHMED, Asrar, et al.
Published: (2012)