Would price limits have made any difference to the 'Flash Crash' on May 6, 2010

On May 6, 2010, the U.S. equity markets experienced a brief but highly unusual drop in prices across a number of stocks and indices. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (see Figure 1) fell by approximately 9% in a matter of minutes, and several stocks were traded down sharply before recovering a short...

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Main Authors: LEE, Wing Bernard, CHENG, Shih-Fen, KOH, Annie
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2011
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1392
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2391/viewcontent/SSRN_id1701078.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sis_research-23912017-08-24T09:08:15Z Would price limits have made any difference to the 'Flash Crash' on May 6, 2010 LEE, Wing Bernard CHENG, Shih-Fen KOH, Annie On May 6, 2010, the U.S. equity markets experienced a brief but highly unusual drop in prices across a number of stocks and indices. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (see Figure 1) fell by approximately 9% in a matter of minutes, and several stocks were traded down sharply before recovering a short time later. The authors contend that the events of May 6, 2010 exhibit patterns consistent with the type of "flash crash" observed in their earlier study (2010). This paper describes the results of nine different simulations created by using a large-scale computer model to reconstruct the critical elements of the market events of May 6, 2010. The resulting price distribution provides a reasonable resemblance to the descriptive statistics of the second-by-second prices of S&P500 E-mini futures from 2:30 to 3:00 p.m. on May 6, 2010. This type of simulation avoids "over-fitting" historical data, and can therefore provide regulators with deeper insights on the possible drivers of the "flash crash," as well as what type of policy responses may work or may not work under comparable market circumstances in the future. Our results also lead to a natural question for policy makers: If certain prescriptive measures such as position limits have a low probability of meeting their policy objectives on a day like May 6, will there be any other more effective counter measures without unintended consequences? 2011-01-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1392 info:doi/10.2139/ssrn.1701078 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2391/viewcontent/SSRN_id1701078.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Multi-agent decision making Uncertainty Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Finance and Financial Management Portfolio and Security Analysis
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Multi-agent decision making
Uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
Finance and Financial Management
Portfolio and Security Analysis
spellingShingle Multi-agent decision making
Uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
Finance and Financial Management
Portfolio and Security Analysis
LEE, Wing Bernard
CHENG, Shih-Fen
KOH, Annie
Would price limits have made any difference to the 'Flash Crash' on May 6, 2010
description On May 6, 2010, the U.S. equity markets experienced a brief but highly unusual drop in prices across a number of stocks and indices. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (see Figure 1) fell by approximately 9% in a matter of minutes, and several stocks were traded down sharply before recovering a short time later. The authors contend that the events of May 6, 2010 exhibit patterns consistent with the type of "flash crash" observed in their earlier study (2010). This paper describes the results of nine different simulations created by using a large-scale computer model to reconstruct the critical elements of the market events of May 6, 2010. The resulting price distribution provides a reasonable resemblance to the descriptive statistics of the second-by-second prices of S&P500 E-mini futures from 2:30 to 3:00 p.m. on May 6, 2010. This type of simulation avoids "over-fitting" historical data, and can therefore provide regulators with deeper insights on the possible drivers of the "flash crash," as well as what type of policy responses may work or may not work under comparable market circumstances in the future. Our results also lead to a natural question for policy makers: If certain prescriptive measures such as position limits have a low probability of meeting their policy objectives on a day like May 6, will there be any other more effective counter measures without unintended consequences?
format text
author LEE, Wing Bernard
CHENG, Shih-Fen
KOH, Annie
author_facet LEE, Wing Bernard
CHENG, Shih-Fen
KOH, Annie
author_sort LEE, Wing Bernard
title Would price limits have made any difference to the 'Flash Crash' on May 6, 2010
title_short Would price limits have made any difference to the 'Flash Crash' on May 6, 2010
title_full Would price limits have made any difference to the 'Flash Crash' on May 6, 2010
title_fullStr Would price limits have made any difference to the 'Flash Crash' on May 6, 2010
title_full_unstemmed Would price limits have made any difference to the 'Flash Crash' on May 6, 2010
title_sort would price limits have made any difference to the 'flash crash' on may 6, 2010
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2011
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1392
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2391/viewcontent/SSRN_id1701078.pdf
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