Dynamic Two-Sided Pricing under Sequential Innovation

Many two-sided platforms offer innovative hardware products that improve in quality and enter the market sequentially. We analyze the impact of the decrease in the production cost on a monopoly platform owner's dynamic two-sided pricing problem, in which buyers are strategic and exert a cross-s...

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Main Authors: LIN, Mei, PAN, Xiajun
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1960
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2959/viewcontent/paper_2012Lin_DynamicTwoSidedPricing.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sis_research-29592014-01-15T06:25:56Z Dynamic Two-Sided Pricing under Sequential Innovation LIN, Mei PAN, Xiajun Many two-sided platforms offer innovative hardware products that improve in quality and enter the market sequentially. We analyze the impact of the decrease in the production cost on a monopoly platform owner's dynamic two-sided pricing problem, in which buyers are strategic and exert a cross-side network effect to the seller side. Our findings show that a greater decrease in cost raises the optimal price of the low-quality product and allocates more buyer-side demand to the future market. Furthermore, such decrease in cost may also lead to a higher optimal price for the future higher-quality product, given a sufficiently significant quality improvement. Thus, a greater decrease in cost can enable the platform to position its product line to the high-end market. Compared to the base case in which the seller side is absent, we find that, in the two-sided model, the network effect intensifies the impact of cost decrease on the price of the low-quality product and makes the forward intertemporal demand shift on the buyer-side more pronounced. Moreover, the network effect propagates intertemporally, which may reverse the impact of cost decrease on the optimal price of the high-quality product compared to that in the base case, when the quality improvement is less significant. Our work underscores the importance of network effects in a dynamic platform pricing problem and highlights buyers' strategic behavior, production cost, and quality improvements in two-sided pricing. 2013-01-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1960 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2959/viewcontent/paper_2012Lin_DynamicTwoSidedPricing.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Dynamic pricing two-sided markets sequential innovation strategic consumers Computer Sciences Technology and Innovation
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Dynamic pricing
two-sided markets
sequential innovation
strategic consumers
Computer Sciences
Technology and Innovation
spellingShingle Dynamic pricing
two-sided markets
sequential innovation
strategic consumers
Computer Sciences
Technology and Innovation
LIN, Mei
PAN, Xiajun
Dynamic Two-Sided Pricing under Sequential Innovation
description Many two-sided platforms offer innovative hardware products that improve in quality and enter the market sequentially. We analyze the impact of the decrease in the production cost on a monopoly platform owner's dynamic two-sided pricing problem, in which buyers are strategic and exert a cross-side network effect to the seller side. Our findings show that a greater decrease in cost raises the optimal price of the low-quality product and allocates more buyer-side demand to the future market. Furthermore, such decrease in cost may also lead to a higher optimal price for the future higher-quality product, given a sufficiently significant quality improvement. Thus, a greater decrease in cost can enable the platform to position its product line to the high-end market. Compared to the base case in which the seller side is absent, we find that, in the two-sided model, the network effect intensifies the impact of cost decrease on the price of the low-quality product and makes the forward intertemporal demand shift on the buyer-side more pronounced. Moreover, the network effect propagates intertemporally, which may reverse the impact of cost decrease on the optimal price of the high-quality product compared to that in the base case, when the quality improvement is less significant. Our work underscores the importance of network effects in a dynamic platform pricing problem and highlights buyers' strategic behavior, production cost, and quality improvements in two-sided pricing.
format text
author LIN, Mei
PAN, Xiajun
author_facet LIN, Mei
PAN, Xiajun
author_sort LIN, Mei
title Dynamic Two-Sided Pricing under Sequential Innovation
title_short Dynamic Two-Sided Pricing under Sequential Innovation
title_full Dynamic Two-Sided Pricing under Sequential Innovation
title_fullStr Dynamic Two-Sided Pricing under Sequential Innovation
title_full_unstemmed Dynamic Two-Sided Pricing under Sequential Innovation
title_sort dynamic two-sided pricing under sequential innovation
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2013
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1960
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/2959/viewcontent/paper_2012Lin_DynamicTwoSidedPricing.pdf
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