Mechanisms for Arranging Ride Sharing and Fare Splitting for Last-Mile Travel Demands

A great challenge of city planners is to provide efficient and effective connection service to travelers using public transportation system. This is commonly known as the last-mile problem and is critical in promoting the utilization of public transportation system. In this paper, we address the las...

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Main Authors: CHENG, Shih-Fen, Nguyen, Duc Thien, LAU, Hoong Chuin
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2014
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2010
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3009/viewcontent/AAMAS_2014___Auction_mechanism_for_Last_Mile.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sis_research-30092015-11-15T05:49:24Z Mechanisms for Arranging Ride Sharing and Fare Splitting for Last-Mile Travel Demands CHENG, Shih-Fen Nguyen, Duc Thien LAU, Hoong Chuin A great challenge of city planners is to provide efficient and effective connection service to travelers using public transportation system. This is commonly known as the last-mile problem and is critical in promoting the utilization of public transportation system. In this paper, we address the last-mile problem by considering a dynamic and demand-responsive mechanism for arranging ride sharing on a non-dedicated commercial fleet (such as taxis or passenger vans). Our approach has the benefits of being dynamic, flexible, and with low setup cost. A critical issue in such ride-sharing service is how riders should be grouped and serviced, and how fares should be split. We propose two auction designs which are used to solicit individual rider's willing payment rate and compensation rate (for extra travel, if any). We demonstrate that these two auctions are budget balanced, individually rational, and incentive compatible. A series of experimental studies based on both synthetic and real-world datasets are designed to demonstrate the pros and cons of our two proposed auction mechanisms in various settings. 2014-05-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2010 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3009/viewcontent/AAMAS_2014___Auction_mechanism_for_Last_Mile.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Ride sharing mechanism design cost sharing Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Theory and Algorithms Transportation
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Ride sharing
mechanism design
cost sharing
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
Theory and Algorithms
Transportation
spellingShingle Ride sharing
mechanism design
cost sharing
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
Theory and Algorithms
Transportation
CHENG, Shih-Fen
Nguyen, Duc Thien
LAU, Hoong Chuin
Mechanisms for Arranging Ride Sharing and Fare Splitting for Last-Mile Travel Demands
description A great challenge of city planners is to provide efficient and effective connection service to travelers using public transportation system. This is commonly known as the last-mile problem and is critical in promoting the utilization of public transportation system. In this paper, we address the last-mile problem by considering a dynamic and demand-responsive mechanism for arranging ride sharing on a non-dedicated commercial fleet (such as taxis or passenger vans). Our approach has the benefits of being dynamic, flexible, and with low setup cost. A critical issue in such ride-sharing service is how riders should be grouped and serviced, and how fares should be split. We propose two auction designs which are used to solicit individual rider's willing payment rate and compensation rate (for extra travel, if any). We demonstrate that these two auctions are budget balanced, individually rational, and incentive compatible. A series of experimental studies based on both synthetic and real-world datasets are designed to demonstrate the pros and cons of our two proposed auction mechanisms in various settings.
format text
author CHENG, Shih-Fen
Nguyen, Duc Thien
LAU, Hoong Chuin
author_facet CHENG, Shih-Fen
Nguyen, Duc Thien
LAU, Hoong Chuin
author_sort CHENG, Shih-Fen
title Mechanisms for Arranging Ride Sharing and Fare Splitting for Last-Mile Travel Demands
title_short Mechanisms for Arranging Ride Sharing and Fare Splitting for Last-Mile Travel Demands
title_full Mechanisms for Arranging Ride Sharing and Fare Splitting for Last-Mile Travel Demands
title_fullStr Mechanisms for Arranging Ride Sharing and Fare Splitting for Last-Mile Travel Demands
title_full_unstemmed Mechanisms for Arranging Ride Sharing and Fare Splitting for Last-Mile Travel Demands
title_sort mechanisms for arranging ride sharing and fare splitting for last-mile travel demands
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2014
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2010
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/3009/viewcontent/AAMAS_2014___Auction_mechanism_for_Last_Mile.pdf
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