Related-key secure key encapsulation from extended computational bilinear Diffie–Hellman

As a special type of fault injection attacks, Related-Key Attacks (RKAs) allow an adversary to manipulate a cryptographic key and subsequently observe the outcomes of the cryptographic scheme under these modified keys. In the real life, related-key attacks are already practical enough to be implemen...

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Main Authors: QIN, Brandon, LIU, Shengli, SUN, Shifeng, DENG, Robert H., GU, Dawu
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2017
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BDH
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/3678
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/4680/viewcontent/1_s20_S0020025517306667_main.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sis_research-46802017-08-30T08:41:10Z Related-key secure key encapsulation from extended computational bilinear Diffie–Hellman QIN, Brandon LIU, Shengli SUN, Shifeng DENG, Robert H. GU, Dawu As a special type of fault injection attacks, Related-Key Attacks (RKAs) allow an adversary to manipulate a cryptographic key and subsequently observe the outcomes of the cryptographic scheme under these modified keys. In the real life, related-key attacks are already practical enough to be implemented on cryptographic devices. To avoid cryptographic devices suffering from related-key attacks, it is necessary to design a cryptographic scheme that resists against such attacks. This paper proposes an efficient RKA-secure Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), in which the adversary can modify the secret key sk to any value f(sk), as long as, f is a polynomial function of a bounded degree d. Especially, the polynomial-RKA security can be reduced to a hard search problem, namely d-extended computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem, in the standard model. Our construction essentially refines the security of Haralambiev et al.’s BDH-based KEM scheme from chosen-ciphertext security to related-key security. The main technique applied in our scheme is the re-computation of the public key in the decryption algorithm so that any (non-trivial) modification to the secret key can be detected. 2017-04-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/3678 info:doi/10.1016/j.ins.2017.04.018 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/4680/viewcontent/1_s20_S0020025517306667_main.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Key-encapsulation mechanism Related-key attacks BDH Hardware Systems Software Engineering
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Key-encapsulation mechanism
Related-key attacks
BDH
Hardware Systems
Software Engineering
spellingShingle Key-encapsulation mechanism
Related-key attacks
BDH
Hardware Systems
Software Engineering
QIN, Brandon
LIU, Shengli
SUN, Shifeng
DENG, Robert H.
GU, Dawu
Related-key secure key encapsulation from extended computational bilinear Diffie–Hellman
description As a special type of fault injection attacks, Related-Key Attacks (RKAs) allow an adversary to manipulate a cryptographic key and subsequently observe the outcomes of the cryptographic scheme under these modified keys. In the real life, related-key attacks are already practical enough to be implemented on cryptographic devices. To avoid cryptographic devices suffering from related-key attacks, it is necessary to design a cryptographic scheme that resists against such attacks. This paper proposes an efficient RKA-secure Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), in which the adversary can modify the secret key sk to any value f(sk), as long as, f is a polynomial function of a bounded degree d. Especially, the polynomial-RKA security can be reduced to a hard search problem, namely d-extended computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem, in the standard model. Our construction essentially refines the security of Haralambiev et al.’s BDH-based KEM scheme from chosen-ciphertext security to related-key security. The main technique applied in our scheme is the re-computation of the public key in the decryption algorithm so that any (non-trivial) modification to the secret key can be detected.
format text
author QIN, Brandon
LIU, Shengli
SUN, Shifeng
DENG, Robert H.
GU, Dawu
author_facet QIN, Brandon
LIU, Shengli
SUN, Shifeng
DENG, Robert H.
GU, Dawu
author_sort QIN, Brandon
title Related-key secure key encapsulation from extended computational bilinear Diffie–Hellman
title_short Related-key secure key encapsulation from extended computational bilinear Diffie–Hellman
title_full Related-key secure key encapsulation from extended computational bilinear Diffie–Hellman
title_fullStr Related-key secure key encapsulation from extended computational bilinear Diffie–Hellman
title_full_unstemmed Related-key secure key encapsulation from extended computational bilinear Diffie–Hellman
title_sort related-key secure key encapsulation from extended computational bilinear diffie–hellman
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2017
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/3678
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/4680/viewcontent/1_s20_S0020025517306667_main.pdf
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