Position manipulation attacks to balise-based train automatic stop control
Balise is a popular wayside device to provide accurate location information for subway station parking by sending telegrams to passing trains. By craftily disturbing wireless signals of balise telegrams, this paper proposes three attacks that may make passengers fall and even cause injury. Concretel...
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sg-smu-ink.sis_research-52252019-01-03T07:58:14Z Position manipulation attacks to balise-based train automatic stop control WU, Yongdong WEI, Zhuo WENG, Jian DENG, Robert H. Balise is a popular wayside device to provide accurate location information for subway station parking by sending telegrams to passing trains. By craftily disturbing wireless signals of balise telegrams, this paper proposes three attacks that may make passengers fall and even cause injury. Concretely, the first attack is to jam telegrams such that balises cannot be detected by a passing train; the second attack changes the location of transmitting telegrams by jamming and replaying; and the third attack is to change the total time of transmitting telegrams. All the attacks exploit the train localization mechanism such that a passing train localizes its position inaccurately and then takes improper control actions. Furthermore, since these attacks are independent, they can be launched at the same time to achieve advanced attacks. As the attacks do not require to tamper with the balises, they can be launched easily. Our simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed attacks. To defeat these attacks, the received telegrams need be verified by a train based on fidelity of telegram data. 2018-06-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4222 info:doi/10.1109/TVT.2018.2802444 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/5225/viewcontent/08281532.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Cyber-physical system security Train-ground communication security Train automatic stop control (TASC) Balise Information Security |
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Cyber-physical system security Train-ground communication security Train automatic stop control (TASC) Balise Information Security WU, Yongdong WEI, Zhuo WENG, Jian DENG, Robert H. Position manipulation attacks to balise-based train automatic stop control |
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Balise is a popular wayside device to provide accurate location information for subway station parking by sending telegrams to passing trains. By craftily disturbing wireless signals of balise telegrams, this paper proposes three attacks that may make passengers fall and even cause injury. Concretely, the first attack is to jam telegrams such that balises cannot be detected by a passing train; the second attack changes the location of transmitting telegrams by jamming and replaying; and the third attack is to change the total time of transmitting telegrams. All the attacks exploit the train localization mechanism such that a passing train localizes its position inaccurately and then takes improper control actions. Furthermore, since these attacks are independent, they can be launched at the same time to achieve advanced attacks. As the attacks do not require to tamper with the balises, they can be launched easily. Our simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed attacks. To defeat these attacks, the received telegrams need be verified by a train based on fidelity of telegram data. |
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text |
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WU, Yongdong WEI, Zhuo WENG, Jian DENG, Robert H. |
author_facet |
WU, Yongdong WEI, Zhuo WENG, Jian DENG, Robert H. |
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WU, Yongdong |
title |
Position manipulation attacks to balise-based train automatic stop control |
title_short |
Position manipulation attacks to balise-based train automatic stop control |
title_full |
Position manipulation attacks to balise-based train automatic stop control |
title_fullStr |
Position manipulation attacks to balise-based train automatic stop control |
title_full_unstemmed |
Position manipulation attacks to balise-based train automatic stop control |
title_sort |
position manipulation attacks to balise-based train automatic stop control |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
publishDate |
2018 |
url |
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4222 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/5225/viewcontent/08281532.pdf |
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