From physical security to cybersecurity

Security is a critical concern around the world. In many domains from cybersecurity to sustainability, limited security resources prevent complete security coverage at all times. Instead, these limited resources must be scheduled (or allocated or deployed), while simultaneously taking into account t...

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Main Authors: SINHA, Arunesh, NGUYEN, Thanh H., KAR, Debarun, BROWN, Matthew, TAMBE, Milind, JIANG, Albert Xin
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2015
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4504
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/5507/viewcontent/tyv007_1_.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sis_research-55072019-12-19T05:55:56Z From physical security to cybersecurity SINHA, Arunesh NGUYEN, Thanh H. KAR, Debarun BROWN, Matthew TAMBE, Milind JIANG, Albert Xin Security is a critical concern around the world. In many domains from cybersecurity to sustainability, limited security resources prevent complete security coverage at all times. Instead, these limited resources must be scheduled (or allocated or deployed), while simultaneously taking into account the importance of different targets, the responses of the adversaries to the security posture, and the potential uncertainties in adversary payoffs and observations, etc. Computational game theory can help generate such security schedules. Indeed, casting the problem as a Stackelberg game, we have developed new algorithms that are now deployed over multiple years in multiple applications for scheduling of security resources. These applications are leading to real world use-inspired research in the emerging research area of "security games." The research challenges posed by these applications include scaling up security games to real-world-sized problems, handling multiple types of uncertainty, and dealing with bounded rationality of human adversaries. In cybersecurity domain, the interaction between the defender and adversary is quite complicated with high degree of incomplete information and uncertainty. While solutions have been proposed for parts of the problem space in cybersecurity, the need of the hour is a comprehensive understanding of the whole space including the interaction with the adversary. We highlight the innovations in security games that could be used to tackle the game problem in cybersecurity. 2015-09-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4504 info:doi/10.1093/cybsec/tyv007 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/5507/viewcontent/tyv007_1_.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University game theory security limited resources Data Storage Systems Information Security
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic game theory
security
limited resources
Data Storage Systems
Information Security
spellingShingle game theory
security
limited resources
Data Storage Systems
Information Security
SINHA, Arunesh
NGUYEN, Thanh H.
KAR, Debarun
BROWN, Matthew
TAMBE, Milind
JIANG, Albert Xin
From physical security to cybersecurity
description Security is a critical concern around the world. In many domains from cybersecurity to sustainability, limited security resources prevent complete security coverage at all times. Instead, these limited resources must be scheduled (or allocated or deployed), while simultaneously taking into account the importance of different targets, the responses of the adversaries to the security posture, and the potential uncertainties in adversary payoffs and observations, etc. Computational game theory can help generate such security schedules. Indeed, casting the problem as a Stackelberg game, we have developed new algorithms that are now deployed over multiple years in multiple applications for scheduling of security resources. These applications are leading to real world use-inspired research in the emerging research area of "security games." The research challenges posed by these applications include scaling up security games to real-world-sized problems, handling multiple types of uncertainty, and dealing with bounded rationality of human adversaries. In cybersecurity domain, the interaction between the defender and adversary is quite complicated with high degree of incomplete information and uncertainty. While solutions have been proposed for parts of the problem space in cybersecurity, the need of the hour is a comprehensive understanding of the whole space including the interaction with the adversary. We highlight the innovations in security games that could be used to tackle the game problem in cybersecurity.
format text
author SINHA, Arunesh
NGUYEN, Thanh H.
KAR, Debarun
BROWN, Matthew
TAMBE, Milind
JIANG, Albert Xin
author_facet SINHA, Arunesh
NGUYEN, Thanh H.
KAR, Debarun
BROWN, Matthew
TAMBE, Milind
JIANG, Albert Xin
author_sort SINHA, Arunesh
title From physical security to cybersecurity
title_short From physical security to cybersecurity
title_full From physical security to cybersecurity
title_fullStr From physical security to cybersecurity
title_full_unstemmed From physical security to cybersecurity
title_sort from physical security to cybersecurity
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2015
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4504
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/5507/viewcontent/tyv007_1_.pdf
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