ObliDC: An SGX-based oblivious distributed computing framework with formal proof

Data privacy is becoming one of the most critical concerns in cloud computing. Several proposals based on Intel SGX such as VC3 and M2R have been introduced in the literature to protect data privacy during job execution in the cloud. However, a comprehensive formal proof of their security guarantees...

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Main Authors: WU, Pengfei, SHEN, Qingni, DENG, Robert H., LIU, Ximeng, ZHANG, Yinghui, WU, Zhonghai
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Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2019
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4512
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/5515/viewcontent/p86_wu.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sis_research-55152020-04-30T02:58:59Z ObliDC: An SGX-based oblivious distributed computing framework with formal proof WU, Pengfei SHEN, Qingni DENG, Robert H. LIU, Ximeng ZHANG, Yinghui WU, Zhonghai Data privacy is becoming one of the most critical concerns in cloud computing. Several proposals based on Intel SGX such as VC3 and M2R have been introduced in the literature to protect data privacy during job execution in the cloud. However, a comprehensive formal proof of their security guarantees is still lacking. In this paper, we propose ObliDC, a general UC-secure SGX-based oblivious distributed computing framework. First, we model the life-cycle of a distributed computing job as data-flow graphs. Under the assumption of malicious, adaptive adversaries in the cloud, we then formally define data privacy of a distributed computing job by introducing a notion named ODC-privacy, which encompasses both semantic security (to protect data confidentiality during computation and transmission) and oblivious traffic (to prevent data leakage from traffic analysis). ObliDC is composed of four two-party protocols -- job deployment, job initialization, job execution, and results return, which allow for modular construction of concrete privacy-preserving job protocols in different distributed computing frameworks. Finally, inspired by a formal abstraction for trusted processors proposed by R. Pass et al., we formally prove the security of ObliDC under the universal composability (UC) framework. 2019-07-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4512 info:doi/10.1145/3321705.3329822 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/5515/viewcontent/p86_wu.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Distributed computing systems Formal proof Intel SGX Oblivious computation Information Security
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Distributed computing systems
Formal proof
Intel SGX
Oblivious computation
Information Security
spellingShingle Distributed computing systems
Formal proof
Intel SGX
Oblivious computation
Information Security
WU, Pengfei
SHEN, Qingni
DENG, Robert H.
LIU, Ximeng
ZHANG, Yinghui
WU, Zhonghai
ObliDC: An SGX-based oblivious distributed computing framework with formal proof
description Data privacy is becoming one of the most critical concerns in cloud computing. Several proposals based on Intel SGX such as VC3 and M2R have been introduced in the literature to protect data privacy during job execution in the cloud. However, a comprehensive formal proof of their security guarantees is still lacking. In this paper, we propose ObliDC, a general UC-secure SGX-based oblivious distributed computing framework. First, we model the life-cycle of a distributed computing job as data-flow graphs. Under the assumption of malicious, adaptive adversaries in the cloud, we then formally define data privacy of a distributed computing job by introducing a notion named ODC-privacy, which encompasses both semantic security (to protect data confidentiality during computation and transmission) and oblivious traffic (to prevent data leakage from traffic analysis). ObliDC is composed of four two-party protocols -- job deployment, job initialization, job execution, and results return, which allow for modular construction of concrete privacy-preserving job protocols in different distributed computing frameworks. Finally, inspired by a formal abstraction for trusted processors proposed by R. Pass et al., we formally prove the security of ObliDC under the universal composability (UC) framework.
format text
author WU, Pengfei
SHEN, Qingni
DENG, Robert H.
LIU, Ximeng
ZHANG, Yinghui
WU, Zhonghai
author_facet WU, Pengfei
SHEN, Qingni
DENG, Robert H.
LIU, Ximeng
ZHANG, Yinghui
WU, Zhonghai
author_sort WU, Pengfei
title ObliDC: An SGX-based oblivious distributed computing framework with formal proof
title_short ObliDC: An SGX-based oblivious distributed computing framework with formal proof
title_full ObliDC: An SGX-based oblivious distributed computing framework with formal proof
title_fullStr ObliDC: An SGX-based oblivious distributed computing framework with formal proof
title_full_unstemmed ObliDC: An SGX-based oblivious distributed computing framework with formal proof
title_sort oblidc: an sgx-based oblivious distributed computing framework with formal proof
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2019
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4512
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/5515/viewcontent/p86_wu.pdf
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