Learning adversary behavior in security games: A PAC model perspective

• Main Authors: SINHA, Arunesh, KAR, Debarun, TAMBE, Milind
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2016
• Subjects: Databases and Information Systems
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4661; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/5664/viewcontent/AAMAS2016PAC_1_.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

Recent applications of Stackelberg Security Games (SSG), from wildlife crime to urban crime, have employed machine learning tools to learn and predict adversary behavior using available data about defender-adversary interactions. Given these recent developments, this paper commits to an approach of directly learning the response function of the adversary. Using the PAC model, this paper lays a firm theoretical foundation for learning in SSGs (e.g., theoretically answer questions about the numbers of samples required to learn adversary behavior) and provides utility guarantees when the learned adversary model is used to plan the defender's strategy. The paper also aims to answer practical questions such as how much more data is needed to improve an adversary model's accuracy. Additionally, we explain a recently observed phenomenon that prediction accuracy of learned adversary behavior is not enough to discover the utility maximizing defender strategy. We provide four main contributions: (1) a PAC model of learning adversary response functions in SSGs; (2) PAC-model analysis of the learning of key, existing bounded rationality models in SSGs; (3) an entirely new approach to adversary modeling based on a non-parametric class of response functions with PAC-model analysis and (4) identification of conditions under which computing the best defender strategy against the learned adversary behavior is indeed the optimal strategy. Finally, we conduct experiments with real-world data from a national park in Uganda, showing the benefit of our new adversary modeling approach and verification of our PAC model predictions.