A verification framework for stateful security protocols
A long-standing research problem is how to efficiently verify security protocols with tamper-resistant global states, especially when the global states evolve unboundedly. We propose a protocol specification framework, which facilitates explicit modeling of states and state transformations. On the b...
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , |
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| 格式: | text |
| 語言: | English |
| 出版: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2017
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4722 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/5725/viewcontent/Verification_Framework_ICFEM_2017_av.pdf |
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| 總結: | A long-standing research problem is how to efficiently verify security protocols with tamper-resistant global states, especially when the global states evolve unboundedly. We propose a protocol specification framework, which facilitates explicit modeling of states and state transformations. On the basis of that, we develop an algorithm for verifying security properties of protocols with unbounded state-evolving, by tracking state transformation and checking the validity of the state-evolving traces. We prove the correctness of the verification algorithm, implement both of the specification framework and the algorithm, and evaluate our implementation using a number of stateful security protocols. The experimental results show that our approach is both feasible and practically efficient. Particularly, we have found a security flaw on the digital envelope protocol, which cannot be detected with existing security protocol verifiers. |
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