Deception in finitely repeated security games
Allocating resources to defend targets from attack is often complicated by uncertainty about the attacker’s capabilities, objectives, or other underlying characteristics. In a repeated interaction setting, the defender can collect attack data over time to reduce this uncertainty and learn an effecti...
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| المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | , , , |
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| التنسيق: | text |
| اللغة: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2019
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4795 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/5798/viewcontent/10.1609_aaai.v33i01.33012133.pdf |
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| المؤسسة: | Singapore Management University |
| اللغة: | English |