Deception in finitely repeated security games
Allocating resources to defend targets from attack is often complicated by uncertainty about the attacker’s capabilities, objectives, or other underlying characteristics. In a repeated interaction setting, the defender can collect attack data over time to reduce this uncertainty and learn an effecti...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2019
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4795 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/5798/viewcontent/10.1609_aaai.v33i01.33012133.pdf |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |