Efficient ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption with blackbox traceability

• Main Authors: XU, Shengmin, YUAN, Jiaming, XU, Guowen, Li, Yingjiu, LIU, Ximeng, ZHANG, Yinghui, YANG, Zuobin
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2020
• Subjects: Blackbox traceability; Attribute-based encryption; Short decryption key; Information Security; Software Engineering
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/5179; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/6182/viewcontent/Efficient_ciphertext_policy_2020_av.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

Traitor tracing scheme is a paradigm to classify the users who illegal use of their decryption keys in cryptosystems. In the ciphertext-policy attribute-based cryptosystem, the decryption key usually contains the users’ attributes, while the real identities are hidden. The decryption key with hidden identities enables malicious users to intentionally leak decryption keys or embed the decryption keys in the decryption device to gain illegal profits with a little risk of being discovered. To mitigate this problem, the concept of blackbox traceability in the ciphertext-policy attribute-based scheme was proposed to identify the malicious user via observing the I/O streams of the decryption device. However, current solutions with blackbox traceability are impractical since either the composite-order group or the linear complexity of system users is required. In this article, we proposed a secure ciphertext-policy attribute-based set encryption scheme with the short decryption key. The proposed scheme bases on the prime-order group to improve computational performances and aggregates multiple attributes into a constant-size attribute set to reduce the costs of communication overheads. By applying our proposed scheme with fingerprint codes, we then give an instantiation of the ciphertext-policy attribute-based scheme with blackbox traceability. Our scheme is provably secure under various q-type assumptions.