Walls have ears: Eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel
Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) are now playing a vital role in many devices and systems including computing devices, data centers, and clouds, making them the next target of side-channel attacks. Unlike those targeting CPUs, existing side-channel attacks on GPUs exploited vulnerabilities exposed b...
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sg-smu-ink.sis_research-65002021-01-07T14:56:03Z Walls have ears: Eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel MA, Haoyu TIAN, Jianwen GAO, Debin JIA Chunfu, Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) are now playing a vital role in many devices and systems including computing devices, data centers, and clouds, making them the next target of side-channel attacks. Unlike those targeting CPUs, existing side-channel attacks on GPUs exploited vulnerabilities exposed by application interfaces like OpenGL and CUDA, which can be easily mitigated with software patches. In this paper, we investigate the lower-level and native interface between GPUs and CPUs, i.e., the graphics interrupts, and evaluate the side channel they expose. Being an intrinsic profile in the communication between a GPU and a CPU, the pattern of graphics interrupts typically differs from one GPU workload to another, allowing a spy process to monitor interrupt statistics as a robust side channel to infer behavior of other processes. We demonstrate the practicality of such side-channel exploitations in a variety of attacking scenarios ranging from previously explored tasks of fingerprinting the document opened and the application launched, to distinguishing processes that generate seemingly identical displays. Our attack relies on system-level footprints rather than API-level ones and does not require injecting any payload into the GPU resource space to cause contentions. We evaluate our attacks and demonstrate that they could achieve high accuracy in the assumed attack scenarios. We also present in-depth studies to further analyze the low-level rationale behind such effectiveness. 2020-12-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/5497 info:doi/10.1007/978-3-030-62974-8_11 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/6500/viewcontent/isc20.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Side-channel attacks GPU Graphics interrupts Machine learning Information Security |
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Side-channel attacks GPU Graphics interrupts Machine learning Information Security MA, Haoyu TIAN, Jianwen GAO, Debin JIA Chunfu, Walls have ears: Eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel |
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Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) are now playing a vital role in many devices and systems including computing devices, data centers, and clouds, making them the next target of side-channel attacks. Unlike those targeting CPUs, existing side-channel attacks on GPUs exploited vulnerabilities exposed by application interfaces like OpenGL and CUDA, which can be easily mitigated with software patches. In this paper, we investigate the lower-level and native interface between GPUs and CPUs, i.e., the graphics interrupts, and evaluate the side channel they expose. Being an intrinsic profile in the communication between a GPU and a CPU, the pattern of graphics interrupts typically differs from one GPU workload to another, allowing a spy process to monitor interrupt statistics as a robust side channel to infer behavior of other processes. We demonstrate the practicality of such side-channel exploitations in a variety of attacking scenarios ranging from previously explored tasks of fingerprinting the document opened and the application launched, to distinguishing processes that generate seemingly identical displays. Our attack relies on system-level footprints rather than API-level ones and does not require injecting any payload into the GPU resource space to cause contentions. We evaluate our attacks and demonstrate that they could achieve high accuracy in the assumed attack scenarios. We also present in-depth studies to further analyze the low-level rationale behind such effectiveness. |
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MA, Haoyu TIAN, Jianwen GAO, Debin JIA Chunfu, |
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MA, Haoyu TIAN, Jianwen GAO, Debin JIA Chunfu, |
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MA, Haoyu |
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Walls have ears: Eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel |
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Walls have ears: Eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel |
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Walls have ears: Eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel |
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Walls have ears: Eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel |
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Walls have ears: Eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel |
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walls have ears: eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
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2020 |
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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/5497 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/6500/viewcontent/isc20.pdf |
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