Walls have ears: Eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel

Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) are now playing a vital role in many devices and systems including computing devices, data centers, and clouds, making them the next target of side-channel attacks. Unlike those targeting CPUs, existing side-channel attacks on GPUs exploited vulnerabilities exposed b...

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Main Authors: MA, Haoyu, TIAN, Jianwen, GAO, Debin, JIA Chunfu
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2020
Subjects:
GPU
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/5497
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/6500/viewcontent/isc20.pdf
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spelling sg-smu-ink.sis_research-65002021-01-07T14:56:03Z Walls have ears: Eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel MA, Haoyu TIAN, Jianwen GAO, Debin JIA Chunfu, Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) are now playing a vital role in many devices and systems including computing devices, data centers, and clouds, making them the next target of side-channel attacks. Unlike those targeting CPUs, existing side-channel attacks on GPUs exploited vulnerabilities exposed by application interfaces like OpenGL and CUDA, which can be easily mitigated with software patches. In this paper, we investigate the lower-level and native interface between GPUs and CPUs, i.e., the graphics interrupts, and evaluate the side channel they expose. Being an intrinsic profile in the communication between a GPU and a CPU, the pattern of graphics interrupts typically differs from one GPU workload to another, allowing a spy process to monitor interrupt statistics as a robust side channel to infer behavior of other processes. We demonstrate the practicality of such side-channel exploitations in a variety of attacking scenarios ranging from previously explored tasks of fingerprinting the document opened and the application launched, to distinguishing processes that generate seemingly identical displays. Our attack relies on system-level footprints rather than API-level ones and does not require injecting any payload into the GPU resource space to cause contentions. We evaluate our attacks and demonstrate that they could achieve high accuracy in the assumed attack scenarios. We also present in-depth studies to further analyze the low-level rationale behind such effectiveness. 2020-12-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/5497 info:doi/10.1007/978-3-030-62974-8_11 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/6500/viewcontent/isc20.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Side-channel attacks GPU Graphics interrupts Machine learning Information Security
institution Singapore Management University
building SMU Libraries
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider SMU Libraries
collection InK@SMU
language English
topic Side-channel attacks
GPU
Graphics interrupts
Machine learning
Information Security
spellingShingle Side-channel attacks
GPU
Graphics interrupts
Machine learning
Information Security
MA, Haoyu
TIAN, Jianwen
GAO, Debin
JIA Chunfu,
Walls have ears: Eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel
description Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) are now playing a vital role in many devices and systems including computing devices, data centers, and clouds, making them the next target of side-channel attacks. Unlike those targeting CPUs, existing side-channel attacks on GPUs exploited vulnerabilities exposed by application interfaces like OpenGL and CUDA, which can be easily mitigated with software patches. In this paper, we investigate the lower-level and native interface between GPUs and CPUs, i.e., the graphics interrupts, and evaluate the side channel they expose. Being an intrinsic profile in the communication between a GPU and a CPU, the pattern of graphics interrupts typically differs from one GPU workload to another, allowing a spy process to monitor interrupt statistics as a robust side channel to infer behavior of other processes. We demonstrate the practicality of such side-channel exploitations in a variety of attacking scenarios ranging from previously explored tasks of fingerprinting the document opened and the application launched, to distinguishing processes that generate seemingly identical displays. Our attack relies on system-level footprints rather than API-level ones and does not require injecting any payload into the GPU resource space to cause contentions. We evaluate our attacks and demonstrate that they could achieve high accuracy in the assumed attack scenarios. We also present in-depth studies to further analyze the low-level rationale behind such effectiveness.
format text
author MA, Haoyu
TIAN, Jianwen
GAO, Debin
JIA Chunfu,
author_facet MA, Haoyu
TIAN, Jianwen
GAO, Debin
JIA Chunfu,
author_sort MA, Haoyu
title Walls have ears: Eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel
title_short Walls have ears: Eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel
title_full Walls have ears: Eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel
title_fullStr Walls have ears: Eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel
title_full_unstemmed Walls have ears: Eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel
title_sort walls have ears: eavesdropping user behaviors via graphics-interrupt-based side channel
publisher Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
publishDate 2020
url https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/5497
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/6500/viewcontent/isc20.pdf
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