Strongly secure certificateless key exchange without pairing
In certificateless cryptography, a user secret key is derived from two partial secrets: one is the identity-based secret key (corresponding to the user identity) generated by a Key Generation Center (KGC), and the other is the user selfgenerated secret key (corresponding to a user self-generated and...
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sg-smu-ink.sis_research-84202022-10-13T05:52:16Z Strongly secure certificateless key exchange without pairing YANG, Guomin TAN, Chik How In certificateless cryptography, a user secret key is derived from two partial secrets: one is the identity-based secret key (corresponding to the user identity) generated by a Key Generation Center (KGC), and the other is the user selfgenerated secret key (corresponding to a user self-generated and uncertified public key). Two types of adversaries are considered for certificateless cryptography: a Type-I adversary who can replace the user self-generated public key (in transmission or in a public directory), and a Type-II adversary who is an honest-but-curious KGC. In this paper, we present a formal study on certificateless key exchange (CLKE). We show that the conventional definition of TypeI and Type-II security may not be suitable for certificateless key exchange when considering the notion of forward secrecy which is important for key exchange protocols. We then present a new security model in which a single adversary (instead of Type-I and Type-II adversaries) is considered. We also construct a strongly secure certificateless key exchange protocol without expensive pairing operations. As far as we know, our proposed protocol is the first proven secure CLKE protocol without pairing. 2011-03-01T08:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/7417 info:doi/10.1145/1966913 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/8420/viewcontent/1966913.1966924.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Certificateless Cryptography Authenticated Key Exchange Forward Secrecy Information Security |
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Certificateless Cryptography Authenticated Key Exchange Forward Secrecy Information Security YANG, Guomin TAN, Chik How Strongly secure certificateless key exchange without pairing |
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In certificateless cryptography, a user secret key is derived from two partial secrets: one is the identity-based secret key (corresponding to the user identity) generated by a Key Generation Center (KGC), and the other is the user selfgenerated secret key (corresponding to a user self-generated and uncertified public key). Two types of adversaries are considered for certificateless cryptography: a Type-I adversary who can replace the user self-generated public key (in transmission or in a public directory), and a Type-II adversary who is an honest-but-curious KGC. In this paper, we present a formal study on certificateless key exchange (CLKE). We show that the conventional definition of TypeI and Type-II security may not be suitable for certificateless key exchange when considering the notion of forward secrecy which is important for key exchange protocols. We then present a new security model in which a single adversary (instead of Type-I and Type-II adversaries) is considered. We also construct a strongly secure certificateless key exchange protocol without expensive pairing operations. As far as we know, our proposed protocol is the first proven secure CLKE protocol without pairing. |
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YANG, Guomin TAN, Chik How |
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YANG, Guomin TAN, Chik How |
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YANG, Guomin |
title |
Strongly secure certificateless key exchange without pairing |
title_short |
Strongly secure certificateless key exchange without pairing |
title_full |
Strongly secure certificateless key exchange without pairing |
title_fullStr |
Strongly secure certificateless key exchange without pairing |
title_full_unstemmed |
Strongly secure certificateless key exchange without pairing |
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strongly secure certificateless key exchange without pairing |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
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2011 |
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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/7417 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/8420/viewcontent/1966913.1966924.pdf |
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