Fine-grained and controllably redactable blockchain with harmful data forced removal

Notoriously, immutability is one of the most striking properties of blockchains. As the data contained in blockchains may be compelled to redact for personal and legal reasons, immutability needs to be skillfully broken. In most existing redactable blockchains, fine-grained redaction and effective d...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: HOU, Huiying, HAO, Shidi, YUAN, Jiaming, XU, Shengmin, ZHAO, Yunlei
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2021
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Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/7563
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/8566/viewcontent/3680359_pvoa_cc_by.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English
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Summary:Notoriously, immutability is one of the most striking properties of blockchains. As the data contained in blockchains may be compelled to redact for personal and legal reasons, immutability needs to be skillfully broken. In most existing redactable blockchains, fine-grained redaction and effective deletion of harmful data are mutually exclusive. To close the gap, we propose a fine-grained and controllably redactable blockchain with harmful data forced removal. In the scheme, the originator of the transaction has fine-grained control over who can perform the redaction and which portions of the transaction can be redacted. The redaction transaction is performed after collecting enough votes from miners. All users can provide the index of the block containing the harmful data to receive rewards, which are borne by the malicious user who initially posted the data. Miners can forcibly remove the harmful data based on the index. The malicious user will be blacklisted if the reward is not paid within a period of time, and any transaction about such user will not be performed later. In addition, the scheme supports the redaction of additional data and unexpended transaction output (UTXO) simultaneously. We demonstrate that the scheme is secure and feasible via formal security analysis and proof-of-concept implementation.