SMILE: Secure memory introspection for live enclave

• Main Authors: ZHOU, Lei, DING, Xuhua, ZHANG Fengwei
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2022
• Subjects: Data privacy; Runtime; Protocols; Prototypes; Software; Hardware; Encryption; Information Security
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/7619; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/sis_research/article/8622/viewcontent/smile_sp22.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

SGX enclaves prevent external software from accessing their memory. This feature conflicts with legitimate needs for enclave memory introspection, e.g., runtime stack collection on an enclave under a return-oriented-programming attack. We propose SMILE for enclave owners to acquire live enclave contents with the assistance of a semi-trusted agent installed by the host platform’s vendor as a plug-in of the System Management Interrupt handler. SMILE authenticates the enclave under introspection without trusting the kernel nor depending on the SGX attestation facility. SMILE is enclave security preserving as breaking of SMILE does not undermine enclave security. It allows a cloud server to provide the enclave introspection service. We have implemented a SMILE prototype and run various experiments to read enclave code, heap, stack and SSA frames. The total cost for introspecting one page is less than 300 microseconds.